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HANDS OFF CIVIL COURT INVOLVEMENT IN
CONFLICTS OVER RELIGIOUS PROPERTY
Kent Greenawalt*
In this Article, ProfessorKent Greenawalt explores how civil courts can
constitutionally resolve conflicts over religious property. Although the
practical and theoretical significance of this part of First Amendment
law has often been overlooked, issues concerning church property continue to raise difficultiesfor both the courts charged with their resolution
and the church members who wish to avoid the courts' intervention entirely. This Article argues that the general approach of noninvolvement
that the Supreme Court has advocated in this area is consonant with
broader themes in religion clause adjudication. Within this more general approach, Professor Greenawalt considers the two alternative approaches approved of by the Supreme Court-the "polity-deference" and
"neutralprinciples" approaches, and examines the justifications underlying both, theirfairness or unfairness, and the practicalbarrierseach
posesfor churches attempting to order their affairs as they choose. Ultimately, Professor Greenawalt concludes that while the general "hands
off' approach to church governance advocated by the Supreme Court is
fundamentally sound, aspects of both the alternativespermitted under
such an approach raise serious problems. As a result, he argues, the
Supreme Court should treat as unconstitutional the "polity-deference"
approach, as well as certain versions of the "neutral principles"
approach.
INTRODUCTION:

CHURCH DisPuTEs IN THEm CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING

When a religious group divides into different factions, each claiming
to represent the true faith, how can a civil court resolve ensuing disputes?
Religious organizations, like other groups in society, regulate themselves,
and the principles of internal governance they have chosen are diverse.
For example, a Quaker meeting, with its requirement of unanimity, differs greatly from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. Some
disagreements that arise within religious groups are so intense and intractable that members may seek the assistance of civil courts. Most commonly a group splits, and irreconcilable factions all claim to possess the
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law; A.B., Swarthmore
College, 1958; B. Phil., Oxford University, 1960; L.L.B., Columbia University School of
Law, 1963. I am grateful for the very valuable research assistance I have received in the
preparation of this Article from Michael Dowdle, Paul Horwitz, Mark Hulbert, and
Christian Halliburton. I have greatly appreciated the insight and care with which Anne
Voigts and other members of the Law Review have shepherded the Article through to its
final form. The result of the efforts of both groups has been very substantial improvement.
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group's property. If matters are not to be left to private force, civil courts
must achieve a resolution of the dispute. But are ordinary courts fit to
decide the issues that have divided members of the group?
This issue of fitness turns out to be a very important aspect of the law
of the First Amendment's religion clauses. Each year, state and federal
courts face many cases in which they decide who controls church
property.' The disputes are between either local and national organizations, or local factions, one of which may be allied to the national group.
Exactly what courts should decide depends substantially on judgments
about what they can decide both competently and fairly.
The practical and theoretical significance of this part of First
Amendment law is often overlooked. The reason for this is simple. The
Supreme Court has not issued a full opinion on the subject since 1979,
choosing instead to leave other courts to work within the broad parameters it has set.2 The practical significance of decisions within these parameters is amply shown both by continuing litigation and by the steps
religious organizations take to order their affairs to yield the consequences they want. The theoretical significance of this subject is more
complex.
The Supreme Court's basic constitutional approach, established in
three cases decided between 1969 and 1979, is that secular courts must
not determine questions of religious doctrine and practice. 3 Not only
must they refrain from deciding which doctrines and practices are correct
or wise, they must also avoid deciding which are faithful to a group's traditions. Rather, they must choose between deferring to judgments made
by a group's hierarchy or using neutral principles of law, relying on documents that do not require controversial interpretations of doctrines or
practices. It is this fundamental approach of noninvolvement to which
this Article's title "Hands Off" refers: Government must keep out of internal problems of religious bodies when those problems concern religious understandings.
1. The following data show the approximate number of reported cases in both federal
and state courts over a period of fifty years (amassed through a Westlaw search). The
numbers reflect each time a different court had to address the issue of church property;
thus, appeals are counted separately. From 1948 to 1957, there were approximately 166
cases; from 1958-1967, roughly 109; from 1968-1977, 115 cases; from 1978-1987, 123
cases; from 1988-1997, 81. (This search was done in Oct. 1998, in the "ALLCASES"
database).
2. Other federal constitutional standards in the church-state area allow a range of
acceptable interpretations of state constitutions to state courts, and some latitude for
legislative choice. What is special about this particular area is that courts are left to employ
one of two mutually incompatible principles of decision, each deemed acceptable by the
Supreme Court.
3. The three cases were Presbyterian Church in the Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
602-06 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-20 (1976);
and United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449-52 (1969).
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At first glance, this requirement of noninvolvement emerges as an
isolated strand of constitutional law, not tightly connected to any other
doctrines. The Supreme Court has based the requirement on the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, but the Court has never derived it
from standard free exercise and establishment tests. The approach did
not follow directly from the free exercise "compelling interest test" the
Court employed from 1963 to 1990, nor does it follow from any free exer4
cise principle that religious claimants should be treated like all others.
The Court has not related the approach to the standard establishment
test, now in disarray,5 that a law's validity depends on its having both a
secular purpose and a primary effect that does not advance or inhibit
religion, and on its not unduly entangling the state with religion. Nor do
other branches of constitutional adjudication replicate the approach for
church property cases. Yet church property cases are not some detached
fragment of constitutional law, remote from other doctrines. Most importantly, they reflect both the dominant theme of religion clause adjudication that too much intertwining of government and religion is unhealthy, and the overarching attention to equality in modern
constitutional law.
My purpose in this Article is to assess judicial approaches to control
of religious property, to evaluate the alternative approaches, and to explain how these problems relate to broader First Amendment principles.
I begin by analyzing the Supreme Court's major cases, the first of which
was decided in 1872. After setting out the basic problems that an
approach to church property cases must address, I consider in some detail the two alternative approaches that the Supreme Court has approved:
the "polity-deference" and "neutral principles" approaches. I then explore the underlying justifications for each approach, the elements of
fairness and unfairness each exhibits, and some practical barriers each
may pose both for individuals who want to protect their spiritual and financial investments in particular religious bodies and for religious bodies
wishing to order their affairs as they choose. To illustrate the variability
4. For 27 years, the Supreme Court spoke as if the government needed a compelling
interest to apply restrictions against people who have strong reasons of religious
conscience to engage in forbidden behavior. In 1990, it abandoned this approach in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990) (announcing that religious
claimants have no special ground to be exempt from valid laws of general application). In
1993, Congress adopted legislation to reinstate the compelling interest test. In June 1997,
the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
impose this standard on the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168-72
(1997). For those seeking free exercise exemptions from ordinary legal requirements, the
courts have never applied the compelling interest test as stringently against the
government as they have in the constitutional domains of equal protection and free
speech. However, for cases of religious classification and of discrimination against
religion, the courts have used a stringent compelling interest test. See Kent Greenawalt,
Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of Tests Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 323, 329-35 (1996).
5. See Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 359-79.
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of conclusions that courts adopting neutral principles may reach, I sketch
the results of a number of cases involving Episcopalian and Presbyterian
churches.
I conclude that the Supreme Court's "hands-off" approach to governance of church property is fundamentally sound, but that aspects of
each of the two dominant alternatives the Court has allowed state and
federal courts to use do raise serious problems. Most notably, a rule to
defer entirely to decisions within church hierarchies is too rigid; in contrast, a "neutral principles" approach introduces greater flexibility, but,
under certain interpretations, precludes too much that is relevant to the
lives of religious groups. I offer recommendations for choices that state
courts should make under the prevailing constitutional regime, and suggest that the Supreme Court should make certain revisions to that regime, treating as unconstitutional the "standard" version of polity-deference and certain versions of neutral principles. These revisions or
modifications would allow greater sensitivity to the concerns of religious
groups and their members, while compromising only slightly, if at all, the
sound aspiration to keep civil courts out of religious affairs.
This area exemplifies a typical aspect of constitutional adjudication-an imperfect fit of criteria of sound doctrines and actual doctrinal
possibilities. When one sets out to imagine the requisites of an ideal constitutional standard for this subject, coming up with criteria is not difficult. Unfortunately, some of these criteria are fully attainable only by
sacrificing others. This exercise reveals that the needed analysis of competing doctrinal possibilities is not the ingenious solution to a challenging puzzle, but requires delicate judgments that reach to the core of relations between religious groups and governments.
Before describing the development of legal principles, I need to
enter an important caution. All the important cases involve various
Christian churches, and I refer to churches in general, but whatever standards apply to churches also apply to all analogous religious groupsJewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and so on. The concern here is not
just one of terminology. As the variety of religious practices within the
country continues to increase, so will the number of cases involving nonChristian groups. The standards for engagement of civil law with
Christian churches will also apply to other religious groups with which
most judges are much less familiar.
I.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY:

THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF CML COURTS

RESOLVING RELIGIOUS ISSUES

Present principles governing property disputes originated over a century ago. Their earlier pedigree is one major reason why these principles
are set apart from the standard approaches of modern free exercise and
establishment law, which developed later. Following a number of state
cases, the Supreme Court dealt extensively with the problem of church
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property disputes in 1872, in Watson v. Jones.6 Examination of that case
and its progeny up to the central 1969 case of Presbyterian Church in the
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial PresbyterianChurch7 not
only illuminates the roots and complexities of civil court involvement in
church disputes, but also helps set out the most important questions and
reveals serious difficulties in answering them that have remained with us.
Among the important questions are: (1) what degree of civil court examination into church affairs is warranted; (2) what doctrinal approaches
civil courts should adopt if they are to steer clear of excessive involvement
in religion; (3) whether civil courts should avoid debatable issues of
church government as well as issues of doctrine and practice; and (4)
whether there is any room to place religious conditions in express trusts.
In turn, some of the difficulties include: (1) the stark differentiation in
treatment between hierarchical and congregational churches that Watson
suggests; (2) the impossibility of courts satisfying members' expectations
and refraining from any religious judgments; and (3) the dangers of both
rigidity and undue flexibility in the categorization of church
governments.
A. Watson v. Jones: The Origin of a "Hands-Off"Approach
Watson v. Jones has proved to be the source of much of the constitutional law concerning church property disputes. After outlining its facts,
I focus on the Court's basis for announcing that civil courts should not
resolve cases by adjudicating doctrinal disagreements. I then describe the
Court's threefold categorization of relevant cases and sketch some
problems raised by the opinion.
Watson itself involved a division within the Presbyterian Church that
occurred as a consequence of the Civil War. The Supreme Court
Reporter, who found the facts and prior legal proceedings complicated
enough to warrant twenty pages in the United States Reports, took the
precaution of italicizing the names of adherents to one faction so that
readers would not be irremediably confused. From the beginning of the
war, the General Assembly, the highest body of the national Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America, had urged citizens to support
the federal government, and later favored the Emancipation
Proclamation. 8 In May 1865, just after the end of the war, the General
Assembly instructed church organizations that applicants for membership from southern states who had supported the Confederacy or had
accepted the doctrine that Negro slavery is a divine institution "should be
required to repent and forsake these sins" before being received. 9
6.
7.
8.
9.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
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In Kentucky, a slave state that had split during the war, with part
remaining within the Union, church bodies at all levels divided between

groups aligning themselves with the General Assembly and those asserting that the Assembly's stances on slavery and the war were erroneous
and heretical. Within the state Synod (the statewide organization), the
Louisville Presbytery (the local regional organization), and the Walnut
Street Church, pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions each claimed to be
the true representatives of the Presbyterian Church. 10 The conflict in
Watson v. Jones turned on the use of local church property. Initially, the
pro-slavery faction contested the election of anti-slavery elders for the local church. If te election, which had been carried out according to the
direction of a synodical committee, was valid, it tipped the balance
among the elders towards the anti-slavery group. Kentucky's highest
court, the Court of Appeals, held that because the General Assembly,
Synod, and Presbytery had violated the national church constitution by
their anti-slavery measures, their acts were void." Consequently, the
court invalidated the election, and the pro-slavery balance among elders
12
and trustees continued in the Walnut Street Church.
Following this resolution in state court, Indiana members of the antislavery group, claiming diversity of citizenship as their basis for federal
jurisdiction, sued in the federal circuit court.' 3 They claimed that the
pro-slavery elders had effectively seceded from the national church,
leaving an anti-slavery member as the sole lawful elder.' 4 Having determined that this case involved different issues from the state case, and thus
was not settled by it, the circuit court ruled for the anti-slavery group.1 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court relied on grounds
that were strongly influenced by a constitutional perspective about appropriate relations between church and state, but did not rest explicitly upon
requirements of the federal or any state constitution. The Justices treated
the central issue as one falling within the general common law, as to
which, under then prevailing doctrine, federal courts could use their own
6
best judgment, rather than follow state court decisions.'
The crucial question was whether the national church, which would
otherwise maintain control of the local church property under an implied trust, could forfeit that control because of a failure to adhere to
basic principles of the religion. 17 The Supreme Court acknowledged that
in England, courts were free not only to make such judgments about the
10. See id. at 692.

11. See id. at 693-94.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
See id. at 694.
See id. at 695-96.
See id. at 697-700.
This doctrine was established in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 702-06 (argument for appellants), 726-35.
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respects with the
Established Church, which was intertwined in various
8
government, but also about dissenting churches.'
Contrasting England, where even dissenting churches are not free
"in the sense in which we apply the term in this country ... ." the Court
remarked that here, all people enjoy "the full and free right to entertain
any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine .... The law knows no heresy and is committed to the
19
In the United
support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."
States, with its fundamental principles of free exercise of religion and
nonestablishment, courts should not make an implied trust in favor of a
general church depend on faithfulness to preexisting doctrines and practices. 20 People who organize voluntary religious associations give "implied consent" to the governments of those associations. It would subvert
these religious bodies if aggrieved members could later have recourse to
civil courts, where judges are much less competent to determine questions of ecclesiastical law and religious faith. 2 ' The Court quoted a state
court opinion that expressed its general political philosophy: "[T]he
structure of our government has, for the preservation of Civil Liberty,
rescued the Temporal Institutions from religious interference. On the
other hand, it has secured Religious liberty from the invasion of the Civil
22
Authority."
In the course of eloquently propounding its underlying understanding of freedom of religion and nonestablishment, the Court initially divided questions concerning rights to church property into three categories, two of which continue to guide courts. A case falls within the
first category when a deed or will respecting the property provides "by the
express terms" that it is to be "devoted to the teaching, support, or spread
of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief."23 For the other two
categories, no express trust is relevant. The second category includes
property held by a religious congregation that "is strictly independent of
other ecclesiastical associations" and "owes no . . . obligation to any
higher authority."2 4 In the third category are instances when the congregation holding the property "is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete,
in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general
25
organization."
18. See id. at 727-28.
19. Id. at 728; see M.H. Ogilvie, Church Property Disputes: Some Organizing
Principles, 42 U. Toronto L.J. 377, 381-92 (1992) (describing the development of English
doctrine and Canadian approaches).
20. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
21. See id. at 729.
22. Id. at 730 (citing Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120 (1843)).
23. Id. at 722.
24. Id. at 722, 724-26.
25. Id. at 722-23.
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About the first category, the Court said that individuals may dedicate
property by express trust to sustaining definite religious doctrines or principles, and, in line with the general doctrine of equity governing charities, courts can prevent property from being divested from the trust.2 6
For example, were property given for "exclusive use of those who believe
in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity," courts could prevent the property
27
from being used to disseminate Unitarian doctrine.
[T]hough the task may be a delicate one and a difficult one, it
will be the duty of the court.., when the doctrine to be taught
or the fomi of worship to be used is definitely and clearly laid
down, to inquire whether the party accused of violating the trust
is holding or teaching a different doctrine, or using a form of
worship which is so far variant as to defeat the declared objects
28
of the trust.
As we shall see, the Court's approach to this first class of cases has been
substantially undercut by the language of modem decisions. 2 9
For the second category, churches with a strictly congregational or
independent organization that hold property without any express trust,
the Court indicated that "the rights of such bodies to the use of the
property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern
voluntary associations." 30 Suppose a minority of a congregational church
claims that the majority has departed radically from a traditional understanding of religious principles. If the ordinary standard for making decisions is majority rule, courts should accept judgments made in that way,
and not expel a majority that "may have changed in some respect their
31
views of religious truth."
The third class of cases, according to the Court, is the most frequent
and important,3 2 and it is into this class that Watson falls. There is no
express trust, arLd the local congregation is a member of a larger, more
substantial religious organization. For these cases, the Court said the
appropriate rule is that, "whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of
these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final .... ,"3 Applying this rule,
the Court accorded the General Assembly the final say about Presbyterian
doctrine and practice, and, as a consequence, the anti-slavery group succeeded in Watson v. Jones.
26. See id. at 722-24.
27. Id. at 723.
28. Id. at 724. Inthe early case of Craigdallie v. Aikman, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813),
aff'd, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (H.L. 1820), the House of Lords had said courts should follow
express trusts when they existed. The case is discussed in Ogilvie, supra note 19, at 382-83.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 63-102.
30. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 726.
33. Id. at 727.
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The bases for the Court's approach are not hard to grasp. If civil
courts were to deny church property to a body that would otherwise control it because the body has been guilty of a "departure from doctrine,"
civil courts would address matters for which they are woefully ill-suited,
and the legal rule would frustrate changes in religious understandings.
The Court did not mention a further concern. Controversy is not always
over religious doctrines alone; often it involves political implications as
well. Civil courts will note those implications, and local courts, in particular, may be expected to side with factions whose politics they favor.
Despite its essential soundness, the Court's opinion raises some persistent problems. First, why is the ultimate decision ceded to superior
church bodies? The Court's treatment disregards both the import of substantive provisions in church constitutions and the possibility of a mix of
authority (not unlike a federal system) in which neither a local nor a
central body is the final authority on all questions. Suppose the highest
church tribunal blatantly breaches the church constitution. According to
ordinary social contract theory, citizen consent is given to governments so
long as governments act within appropriate limits. In the American version of social contract, drawn heavily from Locke and reflected in the
Declaration of Independence, consent to civil government is not absolute. Why should "implied consent" to authoritative church government
be absolute? The answer cannot be that this is simply in the nature of
church government. The answer, if one exists, must be either that civil
courts are not competent to adjudicate internal limits on religious government, or that their efforts to do so will have untoward effects on religious liberty.
Related to this is the problem of divided power. Church members
might set up a system in which a central authority arbitrates some matters, but not others. Not every church is as intentionally hierarchical as
the Roman Catholic Church. Why should a civil court not investigate
how, in each case, power is allocated? The Watson Court may assume that
no church governments are of this sort, but it effectively restricts the options of church members either to keeping final authority in local congregations or to leaving ultimate decisions about authority to superior
tribunals, 3 4 even though some churches may prefer a more complex
form of organization, with a division of national, regional, and local authority. Perhaps the Court worried that civil courts could not effectively
discern and enforce the details of more complex forms. 35
34. Of course, a church might divide final legislative and executive authority between
national and more local bodies, with the boundaries patrolled by a church court in the
manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court patrols the boundaries of many issues of
federalism. If civil courts deferred to the church court, a church could have both divided
authority and final resolution in a highest church body.
35. One wonders whether some lingering resentment over the southern states making
claims about the limits of national governmental authority lay behind this preference for
final decision by central organizations.
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The Court's treatment of its first class of cases, express deeds and
wills, is curiously dissonant with its treatment of the latter two. If courts
may not competently resolve matters of doctrine and practice, even if
these are part of a church constitution, how are those same courts competently to enforce express trusts? Standards will not be easier to apply because they appear in an express trust rather than church documents.
Given what the Court says about implied trust, perhaps a court should
enforce an express religious trust against an otherwise legitimate authority only if the breach of the express trust is transparently clear, as with the
Supreme Court's example of Unitarians succeeding to funds devoted to
Trinitarian worship.36 If this limited degree of protection is appropriate
for express trusts, why should courts not also protect against acts of
higher church authorities that blatantly violate standards found in authoritative church documents other than trusts? The Watson Court failed
to explain why it seemed to approve such full civil enforcement of express
trusts, while leaving governing bodies in hierarchical churches so unrestrained by documents of church governance.
B. Watson's Successors: Applications and Constitutionalization
In the cases that followed, the Supreme Court applied and developed the second and third categories of Watson v. Jones, and determined
that the rule thfat courts could not assess departures from doctrine had
constitutional status. Shortly after Watson, the Court considered a dispute over property between those who had been elected trustees and
those who claimed that these trustees had been removed. The case,
Bouldin v. Alexander,3 7 involved an independent congregation and fell
within Watson's second category. In Bouldin, the Court held that the removal of the trustees had been irregular, and it wrote, "they cannot be
removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or
meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without citation or
trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules. '38
Nearly eighty years elapsed before the Supreme Court's next important religious property case, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.39 That case,
and a related subsequent one, Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,40 involved a
dispute over the New York Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church.
One claimant had been appointed Archbishop by the Supreme Church
Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. 4' His competitor

had been appointed by a sobor (that is, a convention of church officials)
from the American churches of the Russian Orthodox faith. 42
36. See id. at '723.
37. 82 U.S. (1.5 Wall.) 131 (1872).
38. Id. at 140.
39. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
40. 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
41. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 96.
42. See id.
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Kedroff differed from Watson and Bouldin in the state legislature's intervention in affairs of ecclesiastical government. A 1945 New York law
designated the way in which leaders of the "Russian Church in America"
would be selected. 43 Why had the state legislators interposed in this extraordinary manner? They believed that the Orthodox Church in Russia
was effectively controlled by the antireligious Communist government of
the Soviet Union; 44 in effect, they did not want Joseph Stalin choosing a
New York archbishop. Most Orthodox worshipers in New York and the
rest of the United States apparently agreed that Americans should choose
their own archbishop. 45
The Supreme Court declared that the legislature's transfer of control of the New York churches from the central governing hierarchy of
the Russian Orthodox Church "prohibits . . . the free exercise of religion, '4 6 and violates "our rule of separation between church and state." 47
Noting that what Watson v. Jones said about hierarchical churches applied
to "'questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law,'" 48 the Court concluded that the right to use St. Nicholas Cathedral
"is strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government . . . . 49 The Court referred to Gonzalez v. Archbishop, in which it had said that, barring "'fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness,"' appointment to religious positions is determined by proper church tribunals. 50 The Court concluded that
"[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice
must now be said to have federal constitutional protection
are proven ....
51
as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference."
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion emphasized the long and painful history of political interference with churches as a reason for holding
52
the New York law invalid.
43. See Act of April 10, 1945, ch. 693, 1945 N.Y. Laws 693, 1483 (codified as amended
at N.Y. Relig. Corp. Law §§ 105-108 (McKinney 1990)).
44. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 106-07 n.10 (citing St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 96
N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1950)).
45. See id. at 121-23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 107.
47. Id. at 110.
48. Id. at 115 (quoting Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 116 n.23 (quoting Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)). In
Gonzalez, the Court referred to the similar effect "given in the courts to determinations of
the judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil associations." Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at
16-17.
51. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. The Court rejected an argument that what New York had
done was similar to a federal act requiring that officers of labor unions, as a condition of
having their union recognized by the National Labor Relations Board, file affidavits that
they were not affiliated with subversive organizations. According to the Court, displacing
one church administration with another intruded on religious freedom, whereas the right
of a union to deal with the government was not constitutionally protected. See id. at
117-19.
52. See id. at 123-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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After Kedrqff, New York courts under their own common law powers
transferred control of St. Nicholas Cathedral to the independent Russian
Church of Amxerica. 53 Since Watson v. Jones, the authority of federal
courts in relation to common law had shifted radically. For two decades,
federal courts had been required to apply state law unless that law
violated the federal Constitution.5 4 Thus, the Supreme Court could overturn the common law rulings of New York only if it had a constitutional
basis. In Kreshik, it declared that the judicial transfer of control of church
55
property violated the First Amendment.
Taken together, Kedroff and Kreshik answer important questions, but
they also leave some puzzles. The Kedroff opinion does not make clear to
what extent its invalidation of New York's statute concerns only the limits
of legislative power, as compared to the limits of all government power.
Kreshik indicates that judges as well as legislatures are restricted, but it
remains doubtfll whether judges are as restricted in this respect as members of the political branches are. The force of this question can be illustrated by a hypothetical more extreme than the situation the Court
faced in Kedroff and Kreshik. There, the precise accommodation reached
between the Russian Church and the Soviet government was murky; no
one showed that the Moscow patriarch was simply a puppet of the Communist regime, and the Supreme Court characterized the situation as one
in which "no improper methods of choice are proven ....,,56
Imagine, instead, the strongest case for nonrecognition of a religious
appointment. A foreign country's dictator coerces the appointment of an
archbishop within the United States by threatening to kill thousands of
church members. Or, by a similar threat, the dictator coerces church
officials in his own country to elect his favorite (atheist) candidate as patriarch, and the new patriarch then appoints an American archbishop.
Although no judicial language covers such circumstances, one would expect American courts to refuse to recognize the validity of such appointments. Thus, in extreme circumstances, courts would (and should) resist
foreign political coercion of church appointments within this country
and find some means to determine substitute authorities. It may be, however, that legislatures can never establish general rules for picking church
officials that supplant those hierarchical organizations have developed
for themselves.' 7 Perhaps the lessons one should extract from the combination of Kedroff and Kreshik are: (1) that neither legislatures nor courts
can refuse to recognize otherwise legitimate church appointments made
53. See Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 164 N.E.2d 687, 692-93 (N.Y. 1959).
54. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
55. See Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91 (1960).
56. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
57. Ordinarily, how states divide powers within their own governments is not a
question of federal constitutional law (as Justice Jackson pointed out in his dissent in
Kedrof]), but the dangers to religious exercise generated by legislative interference with
choices of religious officials may create especially stringent restraints. See id. at 127-29
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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in ambiguous circumstances, when the degree and manner of external
control are disputable; and (2) that only courts, not legislatures, can respond to unambiguous, egregious instances of foreign governments
coercing the selection of religious authorities in an international hierarchical church.5 8 No subsequent case involving church property has
presented the issue of legislative intervention, but the lessons I have
drawn remain sensible. Presumably, they continue to represent valid constitutional principles.

II. THE MODERN FRAM woRK
In three cases decided between 1969 and 1979, the Supreme Court
built upon the common law foundations of Watson v. Jones to develop
comprehensive constitutional restrictions on civil court involvement in
church property disputes. Embracing the underlying "hands-off" understanding of Watson, the first of these cases indicates that courts must not
decide which doctrines and practices are faithful to a tradition.5 9 The
second of these cases establishes that this restriction applies to exercises
of authority by church officials that arguably violate church rules of governance. 60 The third effectively leaves courts to choose between two alternative approaches. 61 Thus, they may follow Watson in deferring to the
highest authorities of hierarchical churches, or, instead, apply neutral
62
principles of law that do not require judgment about religious matters.
In this section, I first parse the three majority opinions. I then look at the
views of individual Justices, which reveal that the now prevailing position
was not then the preferred choice of a majority of Justices. Both efforts
shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of competing approaches and
on the law's probable future. For the most part, the remainder of this
Article involves careful examination of the two alternatives that courts
may now choose.
The Supreme Court evidenced unusual unanimity for a religion case
when, in 1969, it decided a Presbyterian Church conflict not unlike that
resolved in Watson v. Jones. In Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, local Georgia
churches withdrew from the national church and claimed that they
should retain local church property because the actions and pronouncements of the general church departed from the doctrines and practices
58. I am not addressing religious organizations that have been institutionally
connected to a foreign government for some time. If members in the United States join in
the understanding that key decisions about church authorities will be made by a particular
government, they cannot later complain when that happens.
59. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
60. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976).
61. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
62. See id. at 602-06.
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in force at the time of affiliation. 63 Their objections to actions of the
general church included predominantly doctrinal matters, such as the
teaching of "'neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith and
Catechisms;"' church practices, such as the ordaining of women as ministers and elders; and political and social stances, such as support of removing prayers from public schools and acceptance of the leadership of the
64
National Council of Churches, which had advocated civil disobedience.
The Georgia trial court submitted the case to the jury on the theory
that local church property is held in an implied trust for the benefit of
the general church on the "condition that the general church adhere to
its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the
local churches. Thus, the jury was instructed to determine whether the
actions of the general church 'amount to a fundamental or substantial
abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the [general
church], so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the
purposes for which the [general church] was founded.' 65 The jury returned a verdict for the local churches, and the Georgia Supreme Court
66
sustained that judgment.
The Supreme Court took a contrary view. Its opinion by Justice
Brennan noted that "[s]pecial problems arise . . . when [property]
67
disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and practice."
Quoting passages from Watson v. Jones which have "a clear constitutional
ring," the opinion said, "[t]he logic of this language leaves the civil courts
no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving
property disputes." 68 Justice Brennan pointed out that under the departure-from-doctrine standard, a court must first decide if a general church
has substantially departed from prior doctrine and then decide whether
the matter is important enough to warrant termination of the implied
trust. 69 Under this approach, civil courts must "determine matters at the
very core of a religion," 70 raising a hazard "of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters
of purely ecclesiastical concern." 7 ' Courts may use neutral principles of
law to resolve church property disputes, but they must not "resolv[e] underlying controversies over religious doctrine."72 Any such involvement
goes beyond the narrow investigation of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrari63. See Mary Olizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l PresbyterianChurch, 393 U.S. at 442.
64. Id. at 442 n.1 (quoting Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ga. 1968)).
65. Id. at 443-44.
66. See id. at 444.
67. Id. at 445.
68. Id. at 446, 447.
69. See id. at 450.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 449.
72. Id.
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ness" suggested by Gonzalez.73 Without distinguishing the effect of the
two religion clauses, the Court considered their joint operation to preclude states from using a departure-from-doctrine standard. 74
The opinion left a question about Watson v. Jones's first category, the
express trust. Much ofJustice Brennan's language is absolute, apparently
precluding enforcement relating to specific doctrines and practices, even
when these are embodied in express trusts, and one can easily see the
pitfalls of civil judges' decisions about the status of "neo-orthodoxy,"
whatever the context. Justice Harlan joined the Court's opinion on the
understanding that it did not forbid "civilian courts from enforcing a
deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a
religious organization's use of the property which is granted." 75 Since
Justice Harlan's examples were conditions that women not be ordained
and that specified articles of the Confession of Faith not be amended, we
can infer that he would require that both the nature of the condition and
the identification of breaches be clear. 76 That is, the nature of the condition stated in the express trust must be one that can be easily grasped by
someone who is not an adherent of the religion, and such an outsider
must also be able to say whether it has been breached. 77 Anyone, for
example, can conclude that most major American Protestant denominations now allow women to be ordained.
What did the other Justices think about Justice Harlan's reservation
and examples? One cannot say. They did not dispute his reservation, but
neither did they incorporate it. Justices in the majority probably
disagreed among themselves, or did not want to think hard about the
question, or both. No subsequent Supreme Court decision directly discusses the possible validity of enforcing some express trusts.
73. Id. at 451.
74. See id. at 450-52.
75. Id. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. The majority opinion, which Harlanjoined, is one basis for my conclusion about
the scope of his reservation about express trusts. The majority said, "[s]tates, religious
organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as
not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions." Id. at 449. Civil courts
were not to enforce even express trusts if that required delicate interpretation of doctrines
and practices.
77. If a grant were conditioned on a church "remaining faithful to the basic teachings
of John Calvin," the nature of the condition might be clear, but what would constitute a
breach would not be. Commenting on the Canadian case of United Church of Canada v.
Anderson [1991] 2 O.Rd 304, M.H. Ogilvie suggests that the ordination of practicing
homosexuals was at odds with the Basis of Union of the Church, which affirmed "the
primacy of the Biblical standard for Christian life and of Christian heterosexual marriage
as the proper forum for human sexuality." See M.H. Ogilvie, supra note 19, at 399-400.
Given widely varied notions of how the Bible should be interpreted and the question
whether someone engaging in less than ideal, or even inappropriate, sexual relations
should necessarily be barred from serving as clergy, I do not believe this "breach of express
trust" (assuming the Basis of Union would qualify as such a trust) is sufficiently clear for a
court in the United States to award property on that basis.
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Within the next decade, the Court decided two other major cases
clarifying just how civil courts may approach property disputes involving
churches. The first of these, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich,78 involved a hierarchical church with its highest authority in
Yugoslavia, then a Communist country. Although political issues did not
appear in the foreground, Dionisije Milivojevich, a bishop suspended and
subsequently removed by the Holy Synod and Holy Assembly of the
Mother Church, did charge that those bodies were "communistic. '79 The
primary dispute was whether Milivojevich, who had been elected Bishop
of the American-Canadian Diocese by the Holy Assembly of Bishops in
1939 (when Yugoslavia was a monarchy), or a bishop appointed in his
stead by the same body in 1963, had the authority to control properties in
Illinois.80 A secondary issue was whether the Holy Assembly had the authority to divide the American-Canadian Diocese into three new dioceses.
The parties agreed that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was hierarchical. Bishop Dionisie, supported by the Diocesan National Assembly,
argued that his removal as bishop violated the penal law and constitution
of the Mother Church. 8 1 Reviewing a trial court determination based on
the testimony of experts for each side, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings against Bishop Dionisie had indeed violated
church law and that his removal was, therefore, "arbitrary" under the
82
approach of Gonzalez.
The United States Supreme Court declared that the Illinois courts
had breached the First Amendment. 3 The principles of Watson v. Jones
and Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull MemorialPresbyterian Church,Justice Brennan
wrote, apply to church polity (or form of government) and administration as well as doctrine. For state courts to make a detailed assessment of
relevant church rules and to adjudicate between disputed understandings
is unconstitutional.
[W] here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such
decisions as binding on them ... .84
78. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
79. Id. at 704.
80. See id. at 698, 702-03.
81. See id. at 706. As far as the creation of new dioceses was concerned, he argued
that the central church did not have that power, given the provisions of the constitution of
the American-Canadian Diocese, to which the central church had agreed. See id. at 704.
82. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268, 280-82 (11. 1975).
Purporting to apply neutral principles of law, the court examined the relevant church
documents and concluded that the Holy Assembly lacked the authority to create new
dioceses in North America without Diocesan approval. See id. at 282-84.
83. See SerbianE. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708-09.
84. Id. at 709.

1998]

CIVIL COURTS AND REUIGIOUS PROPERTY

1859

Insofar as an "'arbitrariness' exception" means "inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church com85
plied with church laws and regulations," it is constitutionally foreclosed.
The issue about the creation of dioceses demanded an interpretation of
the constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese, which
could not be made without "a searching and therefore impermissible in86
quiry into church polity."
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent with Justice Stevens, would have affirmed the actions of the Illinois courts.8 7 He argued that those courts
were not implementing their own religious views, but trying to settle who
the real bishop of the church was. 8 8 Justice Rehnquist argued that Watson
v. Jones had indicated that religious organizations should be treated like
other private voluntary associations.8 9 Regarding the Court's approach as
one of blind deference, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[t] o make available the
coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of
hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not accorded
similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free
exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more serious
problems under the Establishment Clause." 90
In Jones v. Wolf,91 another Presbyterian church case, the Court indicated that civil courts need not defer to higher church authorities if they
instead rely on authoritative documents that can be interpreted without
invoking religious understandings. The response of the Georgia
Supreme Court to the decision in Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church had been to abandon any rule of an implied trust for
the general church; instead, courts were to rely on relevant documents to
determine property rights.92 Jones v. Wolf presented an application of
that method.9 3 Most of the local congregation of the Vineville Church in
Macon, Georgia, had voted to withdraw from the Presbyterian Church in
the United States and to join another denomination. 94 The AugustaMacon Presbytery of the Church responded by declaring the remaining
minority faction to be the "true congregation," and members of that fac85. Id. at 713. Michael G. Weisberg suggests that claims of fraud and collusion
remain possible bases for overturning decisions of church authorities. See Michael G.
Weisberg, Note, Balancing Cultural Integrity Against Individual Liberty: Civil Court
Review of Ecclesiastical Judgments, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 955, 973-79 (1992).
86. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 723. Thus, despite the attempt of the state
courts to rely on neutral principles of law, their resolution unacceptably determined
ecclesiastical matters.
87. See id. at 725-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 728 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 714 (1872)).
90. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
92. See id. at 601.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 598.
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don sued to establish their right to the local church property. Applying
neutral principles of law, the Georgia courts found that the property belonged to the local church, represented by the majority.9 5 Reviewing this
disposition, the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four split,
upheld Georgia's general approach, but was uncertain about one stage of
the state court's resolution. The deeds conveyed property to the local
church, and neither state statutes nor the corporate charter of the local
church conferred an interest in the property on the general church. Nor
did the Book of Church Order of the national Presbyterian Church have
language creating a trust in favor of the general church. Examining
these documents, the Georgia courts concluded that the local church
held the property.9 6 Since this method required no resolution of issues

of doctrine and. 97
church polity, the Supreme Court found it constitutionally permissible.
Having determined the local church's right to the property, the state
courts awarded it to the local majority. 98 The Supreme Court found the
basis for this last step to be unclear. 99 Had the courts merely adopted an
ordinary, acceptable, legal presumption that, absent a contrary indication, a majority represents a voluntary religious association, or had the
courts relied on laws and regulations of the Presbyterian Church to determine who represents the local church? The latter reliance could require
civil courts to resolve debatable matters of church polity-the very difficulty that doomed the efforts of the Illinois courts in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese.100 An ordinary presumption of majority rule, however,
would be entirely appropriate. 1 0 ' The Supreme Court said that a presumptive rule of majority representation c6uld be overcome by provisions
in the corporate charter or constitution of the general church showing
that the identity of the local church is to be established differently. What
courts could not do was rely on "considerations of religious doctrine and
polity."10 2 It is not easy to mark the distinction between inquiries the
Court allows and those it does not, but apparently courts cannot make
determinations about religious polity unless those are clearly established
by documents that can be interpreted apart from any religious
understanding.10 3

Justice Powell's dissent objected that the Court's opinion endorsed
greater involvement of civil courts in church controversies than had ear95. See Jones v. Wolf, 243 S.E.2d 860, 862-63 (Ga. 1978).
96. See id. at 863-64.

97. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.
98. See Jones, 243 S.E.2d at 864.
99. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 601, 607-08.
100. In some articles, this case is shortened to "Serbian." If one thinks of cases
involving analogous churches, one does not think of abbreviated names of "Greek" or
"Russian."
101. See id. at 607-08.
102. Id. at 608.
103. See id. at 607-08.

1998]

CIVIL COURTS AND RELIGIOUS PROPERTY

1861

lier decisions. According to him, "[tihe First Amendment's Religion
Clauses ...are meant to protect churches and their members from civil
law interference, not to protect the courts from having to decide difficult
evidentiary questions.' 0 4 Justice Powell argued that the neutral principles approach would yield results at odds with the doctrines and polity
chosen by churches. 0 5 He complained that the Court, although allowing
an examination of church documents for evidence that a trust exists or
that majority rule is not the controlling principle of representation for
who represents the local church, failed to explain adequately the constitutional limits on using such evidence. 0 6 For courts to regard in purely
secular terms documents that are part of the ecclesiastical polity would
distort the significance of church rules of governance. That is, lifting language about church governance out of its religious context might convey
a misleading impression about the effect of that language. Powell and
the three Justices joining him urged that, for hierarchical churches, states
should be constitutionally required to defer to the decisions of the high10 7
est bodies within those churches.
For the majority, Justice Blackmun responded that the dissent's
approach would require courts in every case to examine the basic polity
of a church and to determine which unit, either national or local, has
ultimate control over church property, a task that could be difficult when
the locus of control is ambiguous. 108 Against Powell's worry that "neutral
principles" would force principles of governance that church members
have not chosen, he argued that parties can ensure the results they want
by expressing their understandings about control in formal documents.10 9 Many religious organizations, not surprisingly, have tried to
put their property affairs in order, but the ordinary limitations of foresight about events and ambiguities of language, as well as uncertainties
about how courts will make decisions, render this opportunity less than a
perfect guarantee that relevant aspirations will be fulfilled. I explore
some of these difficulties below.
Along with Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, Jones v. Wolf leaves state
courts a significant range of choice as to how they will handle church
property disputes. But examination of the two majority opinions does
not fairly reflect the divisions among the Justices, which help reveal possible alternatives for the future and the difficulties for the states of choosing wisely. A count of judicial votes reveals that only three Justices actually favored giving states a choice between neutral principles and

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 613 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 610-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 613 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 605.
See id. at 605-06.
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deference to hierarchical decisions. 1 0° Four Justices, the dissenters in
Jones v. Wolf, rejected the neutral principles approach in favor of the deference mandated by Watson v. Jones and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese.
These Justices would have countenanced more involvement of the courts
with ecclesiastical documents about church governance than the majority
in Jones v. Wolf was willing to accept.
Two Justices, Rehnquist and Stevens, as shown by the former's dissent in SerbianEastern Orthodox Diocese, thought courts should ground decisions on principles of a kind available to resolve disputes within other
voluntary organizations."' They were less concerned with courts avoiding all disputes about doctrine and ecclesiastical polity than the majority
opinion in Jones v. Wolf (which they joined) suggests. 1 2 Rehnquist wrote
in Serbian Eastern OrthodoxDiocese as if courts could treat the purposes and
practices of religious organizations like those of other organizations. 113
His opinion, for example, approved the Illinois court's conclusion that,
"on the basis of testimony from experts on the canon law at issue,.. . the
decision of the religious tribunal involved was rendered in violation of its
own stated rules of procedure." 1 4 He said that Watson v. Jones merely
recognized and applied "general rules as to the limited role which civil
courts must have in settling private intraorganizational disputes,""l 5 and
he discerned from earlier cases the principle that "the government may
not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight
behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect.""16 The expressed
views of these Justices favored an approach less "hands off' than what the
Court appeared to endorse in Jones v. Wolf
It turns out that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are the
only Justices who remain from the Court that decided Jones v. Wolf. Of
course, their views were rejected by seven Justices in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese, and states have remained free to use a deference ap110. The idea of such a choice had earlier been elaborated by Justice Brennan,
concurring in Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God
at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970). That case upheld a Maryland court's
decision to use neutral principles after Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church.
The Supreme Court sustained that approach per curiam, with Justice Brennan writing to
suggest that a state might adopt various approaches.

The majority opinion in Jones v.Wofindicates a preference for neutral principles over
deference. This preference emerges partly in the response to the dissent's claim that
deference is constitutionally required.
111. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 728.
112. Cf.Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 (courts should not resolve issues of doctrine and polity).
For a scholar's opinion that the Supreme Court has withdrawn too far in considering
questions of religiou.3 belief and practice, across a wide spectrum of religion clause issues,
see Samuel Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of
Religious Belief and Practice, 25 Fordham Urb. LJ.85 (1997).
113. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 728-29.
114. Id. at 727.
115. Id. at 728.
116. Id. at 733.
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proach in the intervening twenty-two years. One cannot assume Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are waiting eagerly to disavow that
approach and to adopt a version of neutral principles that is permissive in
what it allows courts to do. Nevertheless, in thinking about what the
Supreme Court might do in the future, one must consider that at the
time the crucial decisions were rendered, only three Justices actually held
the conviction that state courts should be able to choose between deference and neutral principles (as opposed to being required to use one
approach or the other), and that the only two remaining Justices who
approved neutral principles inJones v. Wolfpreviously expressed aversion
of that approach that was less restrictive ofjudicial examination of church
documents than the gist of Jones's majority opinion. Since Jones v. Wolf,
some basic principles of free exercise and establishment jurisprudence
have undergone radical transformation. If the Justices decide that the
principles governing church property cases inadequately serve the values
of free exercise and nonestablishment, we should not suppose that they
will cling tenaciously to what was said twenty years ago. The truism that
language of prior Court opinions is never set in stone seems especially apt
for Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and Jones v. Wolf
IHl. SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE OF DocTRINAL

THE Two BAsic

PossBrrms:

APPROACHES AND IDEAL STANDARDS

FOR EVALUATING

THEM

Review of Supreme Court cases provides only a sketchy sense of this
domain of church-state law. A look at appellate decisions, which develop
alternatives among the options the Supreme Court has left open, reveals
that the law is less straightforward than one might suppose from reading
the Court's jurisprudence. In the remainder of this Article, I provide an
account of what the courts have done in the last decade, suggest the
strengths and weaknesses of various approaches, and ask which approaches are preferable in terms of the values at stake and which should
be required under the First Amendment. To put these issues in perspective, it helps to clarify the major alternatives the Supreme Court has now
provided, to highlight some crucial problems, and to suggest criteria for
evaluating competing approaches. That is the landscape this section
surveys.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has suggested two basic
approaches-a "polity" or "deference" approach and "neutral principles." The first of these approaches goes back to Watson v. Jones, and was
employed in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese. The second approach was
accepted in Jones v. Wolf
The "deference" approach is, more precisely, the most important
component of a "polity" approach. A court initially decides what kind of
polity or government a church has. Legal tradition, from which some
courts have begun to deviate, acknowledges only two tracks: congregational, in which a local church controls its own destiny; and hierarchical,
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in which authority is arranged in an ascending hierarchy. But this convenient dichotomy may not fit when a local church that has no authority
superior to it has chosen to govern itself by rules that do not follow the
democratic, congregational form. Much more importantly, the dichotomy may not serve very well for variations among church organizations
involving a "superior" general church. It neither recognizes possible differences in ways the superior authorities are constituted (from the top
down or by some form of representational government), nor attends to
nuances in balances of authority between higher authorities and local
churches. This Procrustean attitude risks giving central bodies more
power than the members of some churches have assigned them.
Under the polity approach, if a church organization is congregational, courts assume that it governs itself like an ordinary voluntary association. If the church organization is hierarchical, courts treat the decisions of the highest church adjudicators as binding, and they defer to
church decisions. It is a corollary of this rule, although not often stated,
that people ordinarily should not get relief from civil courts if they have
17
not sought review from the highest available church authorities.'
Although the highestjudicial authority in a church might award property
to a local church against the national legislature and executive, the typical consequence of deference is that local church property is held for the
general church. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once put the rule,
"[it has long been established in Pennsylvania that when a local church
is a member of and subscribes to the doctrine and control of a hierarchically governed denomination, it cannot sever itself from such religious
denomination without forfeiting its property to the parent denomi8
nation.""1
There are crucial questions about the polity approach and its deference component. For example, how does a court decide what a church's
polity is if its members dispute that? How much review is warranted if a
church is congregational? May a church be hierarchical for some purposes but not others? Is deference appropriate for "ecclesiastical issues"
even if not for "secular" issues? Can deference be defended as the best
way to give effect to the intent of relevant people, or must it be justified in
other terms?
The "neutral principles" approach calls on courts to use secular, neutral principles when they resolve church disputes. This means, at the outset, that the principles cannot be ones that are religious or ecclesiastical.
The following issues are crucial to how neutral principles are applied in
the typical case, in which a majority of the local church is contending for
local property against a national church that in turn may be aligned with
117. See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 971, 973; David Young & Steven Tigges, Into the
Religious Thicket-Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical
Disputes, 47 Ohio St. LJ. 475, 482 (1986).
118. Western Pa. Conf. of the United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical
Church of N. America, 312 A.2d 35, 37 (Pa. 1973).
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a local minority loyal to it: What documents may courts examine? In
particular, may courts examine primarily ecclesiastical documents, and
how do they determine whether a document is primarily ecclesiastical?
How stringently must courts avoid determination of disputed matters of
church government and practice? How specific must indications be that
crucial property interests lie in the hands of someone other than the formal title holder, usually the local church? How weighty must the argument against the title holder be for the competing claimants to succeed?
If the argument concerns who constitutes the local church, to what extent may courts look at church documents in order to resolve disputed
matters of governance? With neutral principles, as with polity-deference,
lying in the background is the question of how that approach is to be
justified.
Two points are important to note. First, once a court has engaged in
a neutral principles analysis, it may conclude that there is an express or
implied trust in favor of the general church. Given the ban on courts
addressing religious issues, the nearly inevitable result would be that the
general church would then triumph in a contest with a local church. The
second, related point is that neutral principles might lead a court to conclude that a civil court should give great deference to a determination by
a church court or other religious body. If a "secular" analysis of documents places authority in that manner, "neutral principles" leads to
deference.
As we approach various doctrinal possibilities, we can conceive an
ideal set of standards for church disputes over property, standards derived from" the values of religious freedom, equality, nonestablishment,
and fulfilling the intent of relevant persons. Such standards would: (1)
accord churches significant autonomy of governance; (2) afford individuals freedom of religious worship; (3) give effect to the intent of people
who donate money for the purchase of church property and who pay for
its upkeep; (4) treat different religious groups in an evenhanded way,
without favoring any particular doctrine or form of organization; (5)
replicate the standards used in respect to other charitable and nonprofit
organizations; and (6) keep courts out of determining ecclesiastical matters for which they are ill-suited. One needs only to state these criteria to
recognize that no set of standards can accomplish all these objectives.
Accomplishing some as fully as possible means sacrificing others. Since
ample room exists for reasonable disagreement about which objectives
are most important, both in general and in more specific contexts, no
simple formula can tell us which approaches are best overall or constitutionally required.
With these preliminary observations, I will discuss first polity and deference, and then neutral principles. My attention will be on what cases
indicate and scholars observe in an effort to determine which approaches
are preferable in which contexts. My evaluations bring to bear the crite-

1866

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1843

ria for the ideal standards and the values they reflect. At the end, I comment on what should be required under the Constitution.

IV.

THE "PoLrY-DEFERENCE" APPROACH

The opinions in Jones v. Wolf evince substantial disagreement over
the merits of the deference approach for hierarchical churches. A minority of fourJustices asserts that it is constitutionally required; the majority expresses a strong preference for neutral principles, though it treats
deference as constitutionally acceptable. In examining this approach, I
first consider a substantial difference in treatment between hierarchical
and congregational churches, concluding that despite possible defenses,
that difference cannot be justified. I then consider ways in which the
polity approach produces treatment of religious groups that differs from
that of nonreligious voluntary associations. Next, inquiring whether the
extreme deference to high church bodies that the polity approach requires can be justified, I suggest that it does not follow from any view that
the expectations of members and donors should be fulfilled. I point out
that the state can have no legitimate policy of preferring the unity of
general churches over their separation. Finally, I discuss the problem of
how courts make the necessary judgment about what kind of polity a
church has. I note the possibility of nuanced judgments that a general
church has authority over some subjects and not others, and caution that
were courts to discern certain combinations of relative authority, the result could be to unsettle relations between national authorities and local
churches. My overall conclusion is that the polity-deference approach, in
its most straightForward form, has serious defects.
A. Comparative Treatment of Congregationaland HierarchicalChurches
Taken as a whole, the traditional polity approach with its deference
component contains an anomaly that is so evidently impossible to justify,
it will almost certainly not survive. The anomaly is the different treatment
accorded congregational and hierarchical churches once their polity is
determined. Here is what Justice Brennan said about hierarchical
churches in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese:
[N]o "arbitrariness" exception-in the sense of an inquiry
whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a
hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations-is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil
courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highestjudicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters
of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law.
[I] t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions ... are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not
rational .... Constitutional concepts of due process, involving
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secular notions of "fundamental fairness" or impermissible
objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.1 19
A large gap separates this language from how courts have regarded
congregational churches. Their processes of decision have been treated
more or less like those of other voluntary associations, and thus the
churches have had to conform to bylaws and fundamental principles of
fair process. 120 To some extent, greater review of congregational church
decisions than hierarchical ones is inevitable to decide what counts asl 2a
majority vote, as the old Supreme Court case of Bouldin v. Alexander '
clearly demonstrates. Suppose a minister has strong minority support,
but realizes he is likely to be dismissed next Sunday by a majority of the
congregation at a scheduled meeting. He schedules a worship service for
Wednesday and privately urges his supporters to attend. At the service,
he announces that a congregational meeting will follow. A majority of
those attending the meeting vote to terminate the membership of everyone not present. At the "ordinary" Sunday meeting, a majority of those
present vote to dismiss the minister. A civil court resolving which group
controls church property would have to decide whether the Wednesday
meeting effectively terminated the membership of most of the congregation. This case would be an easy one. The court would have recourse to
church bylaws or ordinary democratic principles to conclude that a minority faction could not arrange what was virtually a secret meeting to
vote the majority out. This problem of identifying an authoritative body
churches. One
rarely, if ever, arises for the adjudicatories of hierarchical
122
knows who they are, and when they have acted.
What is nettlesome about the hierarchical-congregational divide is
that for congregational churches, courts have enforced church rules and
democratic principles of governance that go beyond ascertaining a valid
majority.123 If the bylaws require notice and a hearing before a member
can be dismissed, 1 24 a court will invalidate a dismissal made without
119. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713-15.
120. For the treatment of secular organizations, see, e.g., Dixon v. Club, Inc., 408 So.
2d 76, 79-82 (Ala. 1981) (discussing judicial treatment of the bylaws and constitutions of
social clubs); Berke v. Hecht, 257 Cal. Rptr. 738, 740-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing
"[t]he rights and duties of members of a private voluntary association" and "the terms of
the association's constitution and bylaws").

121. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
122. I have earlier mentioned that a question can arise whether they have been
coerced to act or have been coercively constituted by political forces outside the church.
See text following note 56.
123. See, e.g., Trett v. Lambeth, 195 S.W.2d 524, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (discussing
the judiciary's duty, "where property and civil rights are involved," to determine the legal
sufficiency of certain actions); Reid v. Gholson, 327 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Va. 1985) (discussing
the ability of a "member of a congregational church" to seek "the aid of the court in
protecting his civil and property rights").
124. Some courts do not consider membership alone a sufficient secular interest to
warrant the intervention of civil courts. But, as we have just seen, whether some people
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notice or hearing, and it may require those, even if the church rules are
silent on the subject. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Virginia said that for
congregational churches,
the analog), to hierarchical churches breaks down because there
is no body of ecclesiastical law to invoke, no internal tribunal to
appeal to. A member of a congregational church, seeking the
aid of the court in protecting his civil and property rights, may
appeal only to the simple and fundamental principles of
democratic government which are universally accepted in our
society. These principles include the right to reasonable notice,
the right to attend and advocate one's views, and the right to an
honest count of the votes. 125
Six years later, the Kansas Supreme Court quoted this language and
continued:
A congregational church member has a right under commonlaw principles to a fairly conducted meeting on the question of
expulsion, and that includes reasonable notice, the right to attend and speak against the proposed action .... It does not

require formal evidence, the right to counsel, or the right to
present witnesses (unless church rules so require).126
These opinions afford protections the Supreme Court has suggested cannot be insisted upon for hierarchical tribunals, even if church rules
provide them.' 2 7 Observers have recognized that this difference constitutes a kind of favoring of the institutional authorities of hierarchical
churches.
A defender of the sharp distinction in treatment between hierarchical and congregational churches might offer historical or pragmatic arguments. Historically, ideas of secular democratic governance developed in
close connection with ideas of democratic church governance.' 28 One
might reasonably have assumed that members of congregational
churches expected procedures that would be judged fair for secular govcount as members could be crucial for what constitutes a majority of membership;
membership might also be critical for things such as rights to burial plots.
125. Reid, 327 S.E.2d at 113.
126. Kennedy v. Gray, 807 P.2d 670, 677 (Kan. 1991).
127. One federal court, which deemed the approach of Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese to
have import for congregational churches, said that it was constitutionally irrelevant "that
the local church may have departed arbitrarily from its established expulsion procedures
in removing the plantiffs ... ." Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444, 448 (W.D. Va. 1981),
aff'd mem., 661 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981). Another federal court, having noted this
language, ruled that civil court inquiry into disciplinary measures of churches is improper
unless there is fraud or collusion or "an extreme violation of the civil rights of a disciplined
member." First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio
1983). It said civil courts could determine if the body imposing discipline was the body

authorized to do so under a church constitution or bylaws. Someone who claims that
internal disciplinary proceedings are tainted by fraud, collusion, or bad faith must meet a
"higher 'burden of proof' typically applied to cases of fraud." Id.
128. See Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American
Bill of Rights, 8 Const. Commentary 359 (1991).
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emnment. The idea of faith in decisions of particular officials, whether or
not rendered according to due process, may have been more apposite for
strongly hierarchical, nondemocratic churches.
Whatever its historical validity, this account of differential commitment to fair procedures does not describe modem understanding. For
many issues, adherents of hierarchical churches in the United States are
as attached to procedural justice as are members of congregational
churches. Ideas of due process and liberal democratic governance have
now affected most Americans' views of their relations to their
churches, 129 and many hierarchical churches have comprehensive rules
protections for decisions such as dismissal from
to assure procedural
130
membership.
One might defend greater scrutiny of congregational decisions on
the practical ground that abuse and unfairness are more likely in small,
local bodies. The levels of decisionmaking in hierarchical churches may
minimize the chance that someone will fail to get minimally fair consideration, or that people will "capture" its tribunals for perverse ends. Complexities of hierarchical governance are another factor. Civil courts may
be less able to say just which procedures are crucial at what stage. Authority may be more intertwined with religious history and doctrine, and assessing the range of a bishop's power may be harder than determining
how a congregational body should act. When all is said and done, differences in risks of outright abuse and complexities of review might justify
somewhat greater deference to the decisions of the highest tribunals of
hierarchical churches, but these differences do not warrant a stark dichotomy in how hierarchical and congregational churches are treated.
Some commentators have opposed extreme deference to the decisions of church hierarchies. Michael Galligan has argued that a rigid rule
of deference frustrates free exercise, and has objected to the Court's
seeming conclusion that "concepts of 'fundamental fairness' are 'secular'
and irrelevant to church affairs." 131 Judge Arlin Adams and William
Hanlon have suggested that when two local factions are competing, unbounded deference to hierarchical bodies may deprive local church
groups of protections given to members of other voluntary associations,
and thus establish religion. 132 Of course, deciding just which approach
has the least tendency to establish religion is difficult, but these writers
129. See Michael Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83

Colum. L. Rev. 2007, 2025-26 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Presbyterian Law for the Local Church: A Handbook for Church

Officers and Members, 60-63 (Eugene Carson Blake ed., 6th rev. ed. 1960); Daniel B.
Stevick, Canon Law A Handbook, 147-49 (1965) (concerning the Episcopal Church).
131. Galligan, supra note 129, at 2023, 2025.
132. See Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf Church Autonomy and
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1294-95 (1980); see
also Weisberg, supra note 85, at 969 (considering the claim that detached appellate
tribunals in hierarchical denominations may be more objective than congregational
judiciaries, but concluding that greater deference is unconstitutional).
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correctly see that a sharp difference in treatment between hierarchical
and congregational churches is not defensible.
B. Comparison with NonreligiousAssociations
How far does the polity approach conform with approaches to nonreligious, secular associations? At least some value inheres in courts treating church disputes as they treat those arising within secular associations.
If different treatment seems favorable to religious organizations, one
could argue that it establishes religion. If different treatment deprives
participants in religious organizations of various rights that attach to
membership in. secular organizations, one could argue that this denies
free exercise of religion. Needless to say, the same difference that enhances the power of hierarchical authorities may give members less
protection.
The significance of achieving equal treatment of religious and secular organizations may seem greater now than it has in our earlier history.
During the last two decades, the Supreme Court has constructed a principle barring discrimination by content as the centerpiece of free speech
analysis,' 3 3 and it is moving toward a view of both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses under which a government acts constitutionally if
it treats religious claimants and organizations like nonreligious ones.' 3 4
Varying treatment according to the underlying purposes of an organization is not necessarily unconstitutional, but special distinctions between
religious and nonreligious groups need to be justified.
Comparing the treatment of religious bodies to that of secular organizations is difficult because cases similar to property disputes among
churches rarely arise in other nonprofit organizations. Members of nonprofit corporations or the government often bring suit claiming that
those controlling assets of the corporation are either incompetent or are
diverting assets for personal use. 13 5 Such claims of incompetence or corruption are not closely analogous to the church cases we are addressing;
for a closer parallel, we have to imagine a dispute in which those in control are competent and not personally greedy, but have a vision of the
aims of the association that differs sharply from the vision of those who
sue. If the controlling members deviated far enough from the terms
under which an association was founded (or under which major assets
were given), a court would find that to be a breach of fiduciary duty. A
court "would resolve the conflict by interpreting the relevant rules, agreements and conduct of the parties," and by inquiring about reasonable
133. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
134. See id. at 837-46 (discussing the Establishment Clause); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-82 (1989) (discussing Free Exercise). I discuss these and related
cases in Greenawalt, supra note 4.
135. See generallyJamesJ. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit
Corporations, 7 Pace L. Rev. 389 (1987) (discussing the issues involved in defining the
duties of care for directors of nonprofit corporations).
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expectations.'5 6 To take an extreme example, if a large grant were given
to finance the work of needy artists, the managers of the association
would not be able to spend the money to assist needy scholars, even if
they honestly believed that that was a higher priority, and that scholarship
was a form of art.
In a more complicated actual case, New York's highest court reviewed the plan of the Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization of New
York, Inc. (MSSO), to distribute its assets.' 37 MSSO had withdrawn from
the National Multiple Sclerosis Society in 1965 because it wished to concentrate on rehabilitation, whereas the National Society focused mainly
on research. When MSSO could no longer continue its major activities
because of "dwindling finances and the advancing age of its members," a
committee proposed to donate its remaining assets to other organizations.13 8 These organizations provided service to clients with irreversible
and chronic medical conditions other than MS.' 3 9 The New York City
Chapter of the National MS Society claimed that assets built on donations
to help sufferers of MS should more appropriately go to it.140 The
Appellate Division regarded the relevant state statute as adopting the
traditional cy pres standard, under which assets must be distributed to organizations performing activities "as nearly as possible" to those of the
dissolving charitable corporation. 141 Since most donations had come
from victims of MS and their relatives and friends, that court concluded
that the assets should go to an organization helping those afflicted with
MS. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The statute's phrase "engaged in
activities substantially similar to" was meant to allow more latitude of
choice than the old cy pres standard, and the statutory provisions were
also designed to confer a substantial role on the board of the dissolving
corporation in making the choice of beneficiaries. 142 The point that mat136. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien
Institutions, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 335, 338 (1986) (citing Iowa Ass'n of the Blind v.
Nemmers, 339 N.W.2d 835, 840, 842-43 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983)); see, e.g., Grand Lodge v.
Van Camp Lodge No. 140 IOFF, 479 A.2d 544, 546-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); see generally
Developments in the Law, Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1578 (1992)
(exploring the nature of nonprofit corporations and some of the laws governing them,
differentiating between those serving private purposes and those performing public
functions).
137. See In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of New York, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861, 861
(N.Y. 1986); see also NewJersey Ass'n for Children with Learning Disabilities v. Burlington
County Ass'n for Children with Learning Disabilities, 415 A.2d 1196, 1197 (NJ. 1980) (the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, looked at relevant documents to
conclude that property was held by the local section; it explicitly rejected the trial court's
view that the case was governed by the principles applicable to hierarchical religious
organizations).
138. In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of New York, 496 N.E.2d at 862.
139. See id. at 863.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 867.
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ters for our purposes is that under either the common law cy pres standard
or New York's less restrictive approach, courts will compare the purposes
of various charitable organizations to see how closely they resemble each
other. They would not undertake a similar inquiry about religious
purposes.
Since all judicial approaches to religious disputes have varied somewhat from the standard approach to secular organizations, we need to
inquire how the polity approach differs, and whether it differs more than
do other approaches. We also need to ask whether an approach that
eliminates differences between churches and other organizations is
defensible.
For both hierarchical and congregational churches, the polity
approach differs from how secular associations are treated in that courts
will not say when a shift in dominant understanding of purpose has become too great. 1 43 The polity approach also gives extraordinary treatment to religious associations in its absolute deference to the highestjudicatories of hierarchical religious organizations. The consequence is
that property will be held in trust for a national church if the highest
national church authority says so. In certain respects, congregational
churches are regarded like secular voluntary associations; courts make
sure a true majority has acted, and enforce internal rules and (to some
degree) fair procedures and democratic notions of governance.
Although the polity approach of Watson v. Jones and its successors
does not fit approaches to secular associations very closely, the approach
it replaced may have been even worse. Under the rejected standard,
there was an implied trust for the general body of a hierarchical church
only so long as it remained faithful to fundamental doctrines that had
been accepted when property was donated or given in trust, or when a
local church joined the general organization; a majority of a congregational church might also forfeit its control of property if it was guilty of a
departure from doctrine.'4 If money were given for specific purposes to
a secular organization, courts would require that it be spent roughly in
accord with those purposes, but they would not investigate in detail
whether some ideas related to the basic purposes had shifted. The departure-from-doctrine approach could involve more severe scrutiny of an association's prevailing beliefs and practices than would the approach for
ordinary secular associations.
Another odd feature for which there would be no parallel in secular
cases concerned crucial moments in time. Suppose a church building
was financed by local parishioners, and the local church then joined a
national hierarchical denomination. Many years passed, and the money
spent for upkeep and improvement of the church far exceeded the origi143. Nonetheless, the courts would presumably not accept a decision by the highest
authorities to abandon religion altogether and convert efforts to another sphere of activity.
144. See Sirico, supra note 136, at 344-47.
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nal expenditure. Even if the original church bvilding had not been given
in trust or donated, the departure-from-doctrine test used the date of
joining the hierarchical organization to assess shifts in doctrine and practice. 1 45 No matter that over the years both the general church and the
majority of the local church had altered their views and practices substantially. Understandings at the time of joining controlled. The test gave
short shrift to historical evolutions in doctrines and practices, importing a
rigidity one would not expect with secular associations. 14 6 Thus, the old
departure-from-doctrine approach may have corresponded even less well
with how secular organizations are treated than the modem polity
approach.
Louis Sirico has commented that the deference component of the
polity approach treats churches as alien; its "assumptions about the nature of church organization and about judicial competence describe an
extremely autonomous organization that courts treat as more immune
from judicial review than any other organization in American society." 1 47
Although Sirico is right that the courts would not be so hesitant to con148
sider the procedures of internal governance of other organizations,
perhaps we can imagine a secular analogue to their withdrawal from issues of religious doctrine.
Courts have rarely, if ever, dealt with splits in secular organizations
over purpose, when the purposes involved promulgating ideas. Suppose
that a national organization set up to protect "freedom of speech" shifts
its position across a substantial spectrum. In contrast to earlier stands, it
now supports stringent restrictions on sexually explicit speech and hate
speech, on the ground that all such speech interferes with the "free
speech" of members of audiences and those who are indirectly affected
(e.g., women, in the case of pornography consumed by men). A "local"
faithful to the old views withdraws from the national and claims that it
should keep property donated to it. Suppose further that a court would
be inclined to find that the property was given in trust for the national,
were there not a powerful claim that it had deviated from the organization's basic purposes. This problem resembles that which arises in religious cases.
The Supreme Court has strongly emphasized that the First
Amendment bars government from making content distinctions among
speech, favoring one position over another because of its content. Of
course, the local's claim here is not that its positions are morally and
constitutionally more sound than those of the national organization, but
145. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 734 (1872).
146. Cf. Sirico, supra note 136, at 351 (comparing judicial review accorded to
religious associations' internal decisionmaling to that applied to secular organizations).
147. Id. at 351; see id. at 353.
148. See also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 132, at 1294-95 (distinguishing
deferential standard applied to religious hierarchical organizations' internal decisions as
exception to normal rules of property dispute resolution).
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that its positions fit with the purpose of promoting free speech as understood by those who donated property. Nevertheless, a court (or jury)
reaching ajudgnent about this will find it hard to avoid considering the
merits of the national's shift. Property may have been donated before
feminists developed the argument that pornography oppresses women.
A judge persuaded by this feminist argument might reason that the
donor would have regarded a shift in position on sexually explicit speech
as desirable, if she had been aware of the argument. On the other hand,
ajudge who regards the argument as weak might decide that the national
organization must have given way to political pressure or been captured
by people who no longer sympathize with its basic purposes.
A court facing such a problem might take the view that it should not
decide which positions on particular issues fit with overall political purposes because doing so would be too close to deciding which positions
are right. The court might come up with a rule of deferring to the decisions of the highest authorities in hierarchical organizations on such
subjects. If so, when ideological positions were crucially at issue, we
would have a secular equivalent to a central aspect of the deference rule
for churches. One consequence would be that a defender of deference
for church decisions could deny that that approach differs from the approach for all secular organizations. He could claim that the treatment
is, or should be, similar for secular organizations that are relevantly
similar.
Whatever may be true for ideological secular organizations, there is
substantial divergence between judicial deference to higher ecclesiastical
bodies and judicial treatment of most secular associations. Whether
"neutral principles" fits any better with approaches to secular organizations is a question I reserve for the section on neutral principles.
C. A ContractualApproach?
The Watson and Serbian Eastern OrthodoxDiocese Courts cast the deference approach as one based on contractual principles: People join hierarchical churches with the understanding that the highest bodies will settle matters. But the idea that members give implied consent to whatever
the hierarchy does is not tenable for many members of many churches.
They may have consented, instead, to acceptance of the hierarchy's decisions so long as the hierarchy observes the rules of the church. Even
without violating its own rules, the hierarchy may shift radically in some
respect. It may admit women or gays as priests for the first time, or fall
under the control of an atheist government. Do local church members
mean to adhere to hierarchical decisions in such altered conditions,
rather than to the principles prevailing when they decided to join, or to
local officials who refuse to follow the hierarchy? No confident generalization can capture what highly diverse local members have in mind.
However, Sirico has commented, "[i]n a country that extolls democracy,
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most citizens would find it permissible but curious if all members of hier1 49
archical churches engaged in complete submission to authority."'

If we stood back from the law compelling deference, we might conclude that much depends on the particular denomination involved.
Roman Catholics may continue to have a sense that their main attachment is to an international church. In contrast, many Protestants now
join a local church that seems suitable, with relatively little concern about
the general denomination; they switch denominations freely and, regardless of denomination, may consider the congregational government of
their local church as most important. 150 Perhaps donors of property or
large sums of money have more attachment to a central denomination
than the average parishioner, but one can hardly assume that loyalty is to
the general denomination, regardless of how doctrines shift, procedures
are observed, or foreign political influences are brought to bear. And, as
Michael Galligan has urged, "[s]ome churches resemble a federation of
autonomous groups rather than a totally integrated entity. Even when a
church is essentially hierarchical, agreements of union between specific
churches and the central body may modify the amount of power granted
church authorities.' 5 Any notion that loyalty would be to the general
church in all circumstances is a fiction about the wishes of donors and
contributors grounded upon the division of all church government into
two rigid boxes.
Could one nevertheless defend deference as the best civil courts can
do, given their incapacity to discern subtle loyalties of church members?
Many people's long-term attachments do still lie with general
churches, 15 2 and these people may believe that the higher bodies of their
churches, including perhaps their own structure of religious courts, can
best satisfy their expectations. Perhaps disregarding procedural lapses is
justified because identifying violations is often complicated in a hierarchical church structure, 153 and procedural specifications may be merely
guides rather than prerequisites for a valid decision. In light of these
uncertainties, is deference to hierarchical judgment a workable rule that
at least does reasonable justice to expectations?
149. Sirico, supra note 136, at 352.
150. See Roger Bennett, Note, Church Property Disputes in the Age of "CommonCore Protestantism": A Legislative Facts Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law, 57 Ind.
LJ. 163, 171-73 (1982). In the area where I went to school, the "community" church
happened to be Dutch Reformed. Most of the teenagers confirmed in the church, and
many adult members, had little special feeling for the Dutch Reformed Church, as
contrasted with the Presbyterian, Methodist, or Congregational denominations. In the era
of Watson, church members cared more about their particular denominations. See id.
151. Galligan, supra note 129, at 2024 (footnote omitted).
152. The fact that property is held formally by local churches does not indicate
primary loyalty, since many states once required that property be held in the name of local
churches or local church corporations.
153. Nevertheless, the more elaborate codes present in many hierarchical churches
make this doubtful.
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At least in the modem world, this rationale rings hollow for many
churches that count as hierarchical. For situations in which members
claim that religious bodies have acted in blatant disregard of requisites
established by the churches themselves, one would need to have a dim
view about other approaches to conclude that absolute deference is the
best way to satisfy the expectations of members.
D. Favoring Unity of the General Church?
Another conceivable reason for favoring the general church as much
as the deference approach does is to promote unity or centralized government. Perhaps part of what was going on in Watson v. Jones was a
distaste for secession. After all, the dissenting members of the local
church made claims that resembled those the southern states had offered
for withdrawing and creating a new political unit. 54 In both instances,
the seceders claimed that the national body had taken action that undermined its legitimacy. The Supreme Court may well have been hesitant to
endorse this basis for withdrawal from a national church that had
supported the federal government and shared its opposition to slavery.
Whatever view may have been taken after the Civil War, a general opposition to separation could not now be defended.
Nor should legal rules of the state intentionally favor centralized
church government over local power. The law should be as neutral as
possible about forms of church governance; that principle derives from
the basic idea of nonestablishment of religion. That principle is rightly
dominant in our polity and should guide decisions. 155 Were there to be
any favoring, it should be for local participation and fair procedures. If
one focused on desirable involvement of citizens in political life and recognized churches as one of the main sources of civic participation, one
might favor participatory forms of church organization over forms in
which decisions are made by "professionals" from the top down. This
would generate a preference for congregational and presbyterian governance1 56 over more strictly hierarchical forms, and it would suggest a degree of scrutiny of the procedures of the highest judicatories of general
churches. The model of extreme deference is hardly a democratic one.
Both the dominant norm that the state should not favor any form of
church government and a conceivable norm that the state should favor
154. See Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wail.) 679, 690-92 (1872).

155. Very briefly, if the government is to allow religious liberty and avoid interference
in religious organizations, it should not favor some forms of church government over
others.
156. Presbyterian governance includes a graded system of representative ecclesiastical
bodies exercising legislative and judicial powers. See Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 921 (10th ed. 1994). I am assuming that the highest representative body is
understood to be limited in its authority. For a perceptive account of debates in the
Presbyterian Church between fundamentalists and modernists during which aspects of the
authority of the National General Assembly were sharply disputed, see BradleyJ. Longfield,
The Presbyterian Controvery, especially pp. 151-52 (1991).
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participatory forms of church government condemn the deference
157
approach.
E. Avoiding EcclesiasticalQuestions: Determining the Form of Polity
As it has developed, the polity approach does allow civil courts for
the most part to avoid ecclesiastical questions. For hierarchical churches,
courts need only accept decisions of the hierarchy, and any greater intervention in congregational churches is based on democratic principles,
not church doctrines. However, the polity approach requires an initial
decision about the nature of a church's government. Does that decision
involve interpreting ecclesiastical matters? The crucial question is
whether courts can identify principles of church government without reference to doctrine (or perhaps disputed doctrine).
For every Christian church and probably every religious organization, forms of government relate to doctrine. To take a familiar distinction, the Reformation tenet of the "priesthood of all believers" partly explains why Protestant denominations have more representative forms of
church government than the Roman Catholic Church, within which the
special religious authority of priests and bishops figures so prominently. 158 In religious institutions, government is not independent of belief; rather, it reflects an understanding of how God relates to human
beings and how human beings seek religious truth.
Nevertheless, civil courts may be able to identify principles of governance without inquiring into doctrine (or disputes about it). If, for example, final authority is squarely placed in local congregational churches to
govern their own affairs, or clearly stated rules confer wide powers upon
Roman Catholic bishops, courts can determine these features of govern-

157. In my view, the most for which an objective of strengthening participatory
democracy within churches could properly be used is as a tie-breaker when a choice must
be made, and no other defensible basis presents itself. Even this marginal use probably
compromises the overriding principle of governmental neutrality regarding church

organization. In Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 36 F. Supp. 918, 926-27 (D. Me.
1940), aff'd on other grounds, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941), the court interpreted the
Maine Constitution as imposing an exclusive right to elect their own pastors on all
churches. Such an imposition should be regarded as unconstitutional under federal law.
158. When I was in high school, the national Congregational denomination proposed
to merge with the Evangelical and Reformed denominations, to form the United Church
of Christ. My father was a vigorous opponent of the merger. For him, part of the heart of
Congregationalism was the autonomy of local churches, and the merger contemplated

some greater authority in regional and national bodies than had previously existed for
Congregationalists. The legal controversy over the merger is discussed in Giovan H.
Venable, Courts Examine Congregationalism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 727-32 (1989)
(suggesting that neither of the Supreme Court's approved approaches is particularly well-

suited for determining who has the right to funds held by national bodies of
congregational churches when a split occurs).
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ment without grappling with the doctrines that produce them. 159 Such
instances present no trouble for civil courts identifying structures of
church government.
However, some decisions about polity may require inquiry into disputed religious understandings. I was once consulted in a case involving
a split among a group of Plymouth Brethren who did not believe in formal rules of organization. The church members were divided in part
over their degree of loyalty to a leader in England. For one group, that
loyalty was a paramount aspect of their faith; for the majority, it was not.
Thus, for the first group, the church was genuinely hierarchical; for the
second, congregational. A court could not reach a definitive resolution
of that question without either deciding what was central to the group's
understood faith at some point in time, or accepting the majority's view
in conditions of disagreement and uncertainty. 160
Ordinarily, courts following the standard polity approach have no
problem deciding whether a church is congregational or hierarchical.
This ease is largely a consequence of the arbitrariness of the two categories. Any church whose central body has significant power is treated as
hierarchical; thus, major denominations such as the Roman Catholic,
Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches are hierarchical.
Baptist and Congregational churches are congregational. 16 1 Nonetheless, some cases have caused difficulty, as when two merged local
churches of different denominations establish contact with one of the
denominations, but are not completely absorbed by it. 162 May the semiautonomous local church be congregational in government, though it is
attached to a hierarchical denomination? Ira Mark Ellman has suggested
that the governance of an autocratic minister of a storefront church may
159. Another possibility is that civil judges might need to understand some aspect of
doctrine to grasp relations of church government, but the doctrines and their connection
to church government would be undisputed and easily comprehensible to nonbelievers.
160. See Clough v. Wilson, 368 A.2d 231, 233-34 (Conn. 1976). Because the
Plymouth Brethren opposed participation in activities of the state, the choice to litigate
itself seemed regrettable and paradoxical. This case was ultimately dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, but, ir. dicta, the court criticized the lower court for failing to look for possible
"neutral rules," with which to resolve the dispute. See id. at 234.
161. For this purpose, the merger into the United Church of Christ has not altered
the status of congregational churches; see, e.g., St. John's-St. Luke Evangelical Church v.
National Bank of Detroit, 283 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
162. See Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some
Constitutional Considerations, 74 Yale LJ. 1113, 1121-22 (1965) (discussing Master v.
Second Parish of Portland, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941)). In another case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, considering a "Greek Catholic Church" that had accepted
Roman Catholic priests, concluded that the local church had never rendered itself subject
to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. See Malanchuk v. Saint Mary's Greek
Catholic Church, 9 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1939); see generally Robert C. Casad, The Establishment
Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 419, 440 n.69 (1964) (discussing
cases where congregational local affiliated with hierarchical denomination and later
withdrew).
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be hard to classify: 1 63 A single local church hardly constitutes a hierarchy, but the church lacks the democratic form of a congregational
church. Ellman notes one instance in which an association of Baptist
1 64
churches was considered hierarchical.
In an instance when church polity is in doubt, courts must consider
how they are to decide that question. In Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts indicated that the determination of church structure is a fact. 165 Although courts must eschew inquiry
into religious doctrine and usage, they may look at ecclesiastical documents. An Ohio appellate court noted in dictum that certain Ohio cases
had used a "living relationship" test; though not appropriate for the issues in the case, that test "looks beyond ordinary indicia of property ownership expressed in deeds, articles of incorporation, and like documents,
and examines the rituals and practices of the churches in dispute to de66
termine the governmental relationship or polity prevailing.'
The two-category approach to church government is crude, but the
more courts attempt to refine distinctions, asking whether hierarchical
bodies have authority over particular subjects in particular circumstances,
the more their classifications in individual cases may turn on disputable
ecclesiastical matters. Some modern courts have suggested that a denomination may be hierarchical for matters of doctrine and practice but not
hierarchical for control of local church property. 167 This combination
could make sense. Local churches would be affiliated with a general
church and would agree to adhere to its doctrines and practices. If a
dispute arose between the general and local churches, the general
church could expel the local for failing to adhere to its doctrines or practices, but the local would keep its property. The Minnesota Supreme
Court treated a local church of the Serbian Orthodox Church in this way,
holding that the general church could not dictate how an intracongrega168
tional dispute about membership and property should be resolved.
Under this approach, some disputes within local churches are not subject
to hierarchical determination.
163. See Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal
Church Disputes, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1378, 1404 (1981); see also Venable, supra note 158, at
727-32, 746-49, indicating difficulties deciding who has rights in assets held by national
organizations of congregational churches.
164. See Ellman, supra note 163, at 1384 (citing Crumbley v. Solomon, 254 S.E.2d 330
(Ga. 1979)). The hierarchical nature of this particular association was deduced by the
court from a review of the minutes of its annual meeting. See Crumbley, 254 S.E.2d at 332.
165. 422 N.E.2d 1337, 1343 (Mass. 1981).
166. Southern Ohio State Executive Offices of Church of God v. Fairborn Church of
God, 573 N.E.2d 172, 182-83 (Ohio CL App. 1989).
167. See Kelley v. Riverside Blvd. Indep. Church of God, 358 N.E.2d 696, 704 (IlI.
App. Ct. 1976); Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 241 A.2d 691, 703 (Md. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528
(1969), previous opinion adhered to, 254 A.2d 162, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
168. See Piletich v. Deretich, 328 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1982).
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A court inclined to find that a church is hierarchical only in some
respects must consider carefully the precise lines of division. Of crucial
importance is ultimate control over membership and officers in the local
churches. In some churches, a regional or national organization has final
say over who are members and who are the trustees (whose responsibilities include control of property).' 69 If the general church can expel
members of the local church and replace wayward trustees, assigning
local churches (final) power over property may be ineffective or unwise.
It may be ineffective if the general church can designate who constitutes
170
the local church or who are local trustees controlling the property.
Perhaps the local church could withdraw with its property if no local
church members agreed with the national, but the national might succeed with only a small local faction.
One can imagine this combination of authority having a dismal effect on relations of local and national churches. When a local chooses to
withdraw by majority vote before a national expels members or replaces
trustees, it may succeed in keeping its property. Knowledge of this fact
might lead members of the local to say to themselves: "We had better
withdraw before the national learns of our serious disaffection. If they
find out about our disagreement with their policies and expel members
or replace trustees, we may forfeit our property." A national, learning of
serious disaffection, may reflect: "We had better ensure that the membership and trustees are loyal or we may lose this church property." Local
church members considering withdrawal may care tremendously whether
they will be able to maintain their church building, and the national will
hardly be indifferent, especially if a local minority agrees with it. As a
consequence, the dynamics of local church control of property and central church control of membership and trustees could encourage each
side to act quickly and make a preemptive strike rather than to work
strenuously to settle differences. Any court that concludes that a church
is hierarchical about doctrine but nonhierarchical about property should
allocate responsibilities in a manner that is not potentially destructive in
169. See id., discussed in William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform
Application of "Neutral Principles" in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 St.
Louis U. LJ. 263, 299 (1987). One branch of the Presbyterian Church, the Presbyterian
Church in America, apparently draws an explicit distinction between authority in doctrine
and practice and authority over property. See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 132, at 1332
n.202.
170. An illustrative example is Korean United Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of
the Pacific, 281 Cl. Rptr. 396, 406-08, 412-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The court said the
identity of the "true" local church was an ecclesiastical matter, to be judged by superior
tribunals in the church. Using neutral principles, the court also concluded that property
was held in express trust for the national church. However, suppose it had not,
determining rather that the church was congregational for matters of property or that
neutral principles did not establish a trust. In that event, the general church would have
had no trust, but it could have ensured that the property was used by people loyal to it by
expelling memben; who planned to withdraw. This problem is avoided if the local church
has final say over membership, as in Piletich, 328 N.W.2d at 696.
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this way. Perhaps these complexities are one reason why most courts
have simply assumed that churches that are hierarchical about doctrine
71
and practice are also hierarchical about property.
We have seen that the standard polity approach has some manifest
virtues in comparison with the departure-from-doctrine approach that it
replaced. It also has grave defects. Most important among these are the
extreme deference to higher church authorities, even when they have
violated rules of the churches themselves, and the indefensible differentiation between congregational and hierarchical churches with respect to
requirements of fair process. The polity approach should be embraced
only if alternatives have even greater defects. I now turn to consider neutral principles, its main competitor.

V.

NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Under the neutral principles approach, courts employ ordinary secular principles to resolve disputes involving church government. I first
point out that a neutral principles approach draws no sharp distinction
between how congregational and hierarchical churches are treated. I
then compare that approach with principles applicable to secular associations. Under neutral principles, courts do not afford more deference to
church authorities than that given authorities of secular associations, but
the restriction on religious evaluation means that courts will undertake a
less complete investigation of organizational purposes and of relations
between various official bodies than they would be willing to do with most
nonreligious associations. (This problem, as I have noted, also exists
when courts defer absolutely to higher church authorities.) 172 Neutral
principles, fairly applied, afford religious organizations more ability to
carry out their exact intentions than the extreme deference automatically
given higher authorities under the polity approach, but I show why in
various ways a result under neutral principles may not match intentions.
I explore the crucial questions under neutral principles of which documents courts may examine and what kinds of inquiry they should undertake. Buttressed by the subsequent treatment of Episcopalian and
Presbyterian cases, this discussion reveals significant variance in judicial
attitudes, and suggests how variable the results in similar cases may be
under courts employing neutral principles in different ways.
171. See Ross, supra note 169, at 306; Sirico, supra note 136, at 350. According to
Patty Gerstenblith, citing a limited number of cases purporting to apply neutral principles,
"[a]ll [these] courts will defer to the hierarchy's determination of the 'true' religious
entity. Some courts, however, refuse to grant secular authority and control to this religious
entity." Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious
Organizations, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 513, 545 (1990) (footnotes omitted). If control over the
religious entity is thought to include the power to decide who are the controlling members
of the local church for governance of property, the combination of power and incapacity
of the national church could have the unfortunate consequences I have noted in the text.
172. See text accompanying notes 136-142.
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A. Comparative Treatment of Congregationaland HierarchicalChurches
An immediate advantage of this approach is that it draws no sharp
distinction between congregational and hierarchical churches. Since
courts need not place churches into one of two arbitrary boxes, they can
be more responsive to the range of actual polities. Further, hierarchical
authorities are not afforded an automatic deference denied to congregational bodies. Perhaps, at the end of the day, decisions of hierarchical
bodies will be accepted as more final than votes of congregational bodies,
but that will be because of powers granted within religious organizations,
not because of some initial categorization by civil courts.
B. Comparison with Nonreligious Associations
Neutral principles of law may also appear to have a distinct advantage over deference in treating churches more nearly like nonreligious
trusts and associations. But how well do neutral principles achieve the
ideal that, as one commentator has put it, courts should use "the same
legal principles that are used to resolve equivalent non-religious disputes
instead of applying a special set of legal doctrines"? 7 3 If neutral principles treated religious organizations like other associations, that ideal
would be substantially achieved.' 74 But the concept of neutral principles
suggested by the Supreme Court and developed in more detail by other
courts limits inquiries into purpose. With ordinary secular associations,
courts may examine relevant documents and extrinsic evidence to discern how activities fit underlying purposes, and to gauge whether primary
attachment is to a local or general organization. With churches, to the
extent that courts may not delve into church documents, doctrines, and
practices, they are precluded from examining significant indicia of purpose and attachment.
I have previously suggested that courts might entertain similar limits
for organizations mainly engaged in ideological advocacy.' 75 The free
speech principle of "no content restriction" might entail limits on judicial
inquiry similar to those that apply for religious associations. But no cases
establish such a limit, and none exists for most secular associations.
This creates a dilemma. Insofar as courts rely on decisional principles that avoid disputes about doctrines and church polity, the principles
may be "neutral." in not requiring religious understanding, but, by effectively excluding forms of investigation analogous to those for secular associations, these same principles result in unequal treatment of religious
and secular associations. Just how unequal the treatment is depends on
how much neutral principles puts aside as impermissible inquiry. That
173. Gerstenblith, supra note 171, at 516.
174. I explain above why differences in historical background would result in
something less than genuine equality of treatment. See supra text accompanying notes
72-75.
175. See supra text following note 148.
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question in turn concerns both what documents and practices may be
investigated and the tools of interpretation available to understand the
documents and practices. The state cases, to which we shall turn shortly,
reveal divergences on these questions much greater than one might imagine from reading Supreme Court opinions. They show that applications
of neutral principles are nonuniform and unpredictable.
Apart from what they bar from consideration, neutral principles differentiate churches from secular associations in an indirect, often unrecognized way, which involves their operation against the preexisting legal
background. Courts are generally hesitant to create trusts in favor of parties who do not hold property: They will find express trusts only if the
language creating them is explicit, and they will find implied trusts only
when the considerations favoring them are strong. 176 When this hesitancy has been consistent over time, those who form secular associations
with local and general organizations or who donate property have been
aware of what they needed to do to create trusts for general
177
organizations.
For a long time, the law for religious associations was different. In
many modern cases, the crucial transactions took place years ago under a
legal regime in which statutes required that property be held by local
churches, and the decisional law for hierarchical churches adopted implied trusts in favor of the general church. 178 Since the general church
was the beneficiary of a trust even if no trust was expressed or might
otherwise have been implied, it could understandably take the view that
express trust language was unnecessary.' 7 9 If the background legal settings for churches and secular voluntary associations were very different
in, say, 1950, it may turn out that treating identically documents from the
1950s that look about the same will not be equal treatment at all.
A possible answer to this worry is that once Jones v. Wolf was decided,
churches could put their affairs in order. This answer has force when
everyone agrees about what should be done and is willing to engage in
the required legal formalities. 180 Unfortunately, these conditions are not
always satisfied. Many clerics and members feel that churches should
176. See, e.g., Suttles v. Vogel, 533 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Ill. 1988) (constructive trust will
not be imposed absent "clear, convincing, strong and unequivocal" evidence of fraud or
wrongdoing); Baker v. Leonard, 843 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wash. 1993) ("clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" required to impose constructive trust); Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §§ 23-25 (language creating express trust must be unambiguous).
177. If they were not aware, they could have been avare.
178. Initially, the implied trust could be forfeited by a departure from doctrine; after
Presbyteian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969), if not before, that forfeiture component was eliminated.
179. When courts assessed departures from doctrine, even the language of an express

trust for the general church might have been unavailing against a claim that the general
church had left its doctrinal moorings.
180. For a general account of the formalities of church organization, see Patty
Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 439.
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handle their owm affairs, without a sharp eye to what the civil law would
require in various contingencies. For reasons similar to those that disincline engaged couples from providing in detail for property distribution
in the instance of divorce, church members may feel uncomfortable trying to be very specific about the consequences of a split. On some occasions, the general church thinks that property should be held for it, but a
somewhat disaffected local church disagrees, or is uncertain or divided.
The general church may wish not to exacerbate existing tensions by forcing a definitive decision the local church wants to avoid. 18 1 Thus, the
power of churches to "set their affairs in order" does not eliminate the
significance of the preexisting legal setting for long distant transactions.
Yet another aspect in which treatment of religious associations may
differ from that of most secular associations is the absence of external
state policies to resolve difficult disputes.' 8 2 For ordinary associations, a
state may have policies favoring larger or smaller associations, favoring
democratic modes of governance, and so on. States should not favor
some forms of church government over others; 8 3 their neutral principles
must steer clear of external policies they might otherwise use.
C. A Contractu, Approach?
Legal principles applicable to secular associations are broadly
designed to carry out the understandings of those who have agreed to
governing documents or who have made donations. If legal rules deter
courts when doubt exists from finding trusts in entities other than
property holders,' 8 4 people who donate money or purchase property are
on notice that if they do not provide for a trust, one will probably not be
found. This gives the law an edge of predictability that may aid people in
ensuring that their wishes are carried out. From this perspective, a neutral principles approach for churches is superior to extreme deference,
because church organizations and members can model relations as they
choose, so long as their choices are clear. They need not submit to drastic differences in consequences because the organization happens to be
hierarchical rather than congregational.
Judicial reliance on neutral principles, however, can frustrate the fulfillment of parties' intentions in other ways. Courts may not inquire into
some matters about which the parties care a great deal, namely, doctrines
and practices. The greater the exclusion, the more legal results are likely
181. If the general church claims the right to property and the local church does not
respond, how are the courts to understand what has taken place when the prior law would
have assigned the right to the general church?

182. One might view noninvolvement and neutrality as themselves kinds of external
policies.
183. I do not think this comment applies to some preference for fair procedures,
including notice and hearing, for example, over unfair procedures.
184. See Gerstenblith, supra note 171, at 543-46.
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to diverge from the actual understandings of those concerned. 185 To be
sure, church organizations can ensure that a shared intent is clearly embodied in the appropriate secular documents. Although churches do not
know whether a state is employing neutral principles (rather than the
polity-deference approach) until a state court authoritatively says so, national churches know that many local churches are in states using neutral
principles, and they are well advised to structure relations to yield the
desired results under that standard. Even when they do so, however, they
may face unexpected contingencies for which they have failed to make
explicit provision.
I have previously discussed three serious problems about reflecting
intent that are relevant here. 186 First, for some disputes, many of the
crucial transactions took place before the Supreme Court imposed constitutional limits on how states dealt with church disputes. Transactions
may have occurred when property was held for the general churches of
hierarchical churches under implied trusts, with a possible forfeiture if a
general church had departed from prior doctrine. A restricted neutral
principles approach may not discern understandings behind transactions
engaged in 1900 or 1935, or indeed 1966. The second and related
problem is that when local churches join a national organization in a
journey of faith, they may not wish to concentrate on who will control
property in the event of an unanticipated disaffection. Major national
organizations know that some local churches will consider withdrawal at
some time-history teaches this much. They have an incentive to clarify
matters in their favor, but they may not want to do that at the price of
causing serious conflict, which might occur if local churches were forced,
as a condition of membership, to acknowledge that property is held for
the national.
The third problem mainly concerns small, relatively informal
churches. For some groups, formulating precise legal relations about
property is antithetical to religious faith; others may lack funds to pay
lawyers to draw things up just right. Often, people may have no precise
understanding of who should control property after an unforeseen bitter
split, or their understandings may be divided. A court seriously trying to
give effect to the parties' intentions might have to ask what they predominantly would have wanted, based on their primary loyalties, if they had
been confronted with a split they did not foresee. As the examination
allowed under neutral principles becomes more restrictive in terms of
185. As Louis Sirico has said, "[i]n a parallel dispute involving a secular voluntary

association, a court would resolve the conflict by interpreting the relevant rules,
agreements, and conduct of the parties .... Incomplete evidence and excluded arguments
[in church disputes] render a court unable to ascertain the reasonable expectations of the
parties." Sirico, supra note 136, at 338. Roger Bennett argues, however, that because most
Protestants have congregational attitudes toward church government, the neutral
principles approach overall tends to correspond to the expectations of church members.
See Bennett, supra note 150, at 171-72, 186-87.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
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what courts may consider, any court's actual inquiry will diverge further
from a full inquiry about intent.
D. Avoiding Eccltsiastical Questions: Which Documents and What Kind of
Inquiry?
1. What Documents May Be Examined? - The neutral principles approach, like the polity approach, is designed to keep civil courts out of
the business of resolving disputed ecclesiastical questions. An initial issue
for a court employing neutral principles is what documents it may examine. The three rough possibilities are that a court may look at: 1) any
relevant documents; 2) secular documents as well as sections of church
constitutions and by-laws that are secular in their import; or 3) only secular documents. Another issue is whether the court may examine practices
within the church over time that are not reflected in the relevant documents, in order to give meaning to vague or ambiguous passages in documents or to indicate that the real practices of the church do not follow
the formal documents.
The most restrictive proposal of which I am aware, one defended by
Louis Sirico, is that courts look only at secular documents, such as deeds
and instruments of trust, including church documents only when they are
incorporated by reference in the secular documents and are not too general or ambiguous.' 8 7 The claimed merit of this proposal is that it would
make church disputes over property manageable by civil courts.' 8 8 The
test would exclude much of relevance for original understandings, but, as
people became aware that this test would be used, they could formulate
their relations accordingly.
This proposal has two very serious drawbacks. First, the stringency of
its restrictions could produce very unfair results when the crucial transactions had occurred prior to its adoption.' 8 9 Second, because understandings may diverge or be uncertain and because many churches do not order their secular legal affairs with great care, we cannot suppose that
churches, like major corporations, will always formulate their understandings precisely in secular documents.
187. See Sirico, supra note 136, at 357-58. The author is clear that this approach may
not capture the expectations of parties, but he regards an approach that candidly is not
designed for this purpose as preferable to one that purports to reflect expectations and
fails to do so. See also the recommendation of Marianne Perciaccante, The Courts and
Canon Law, 6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 171, 192 (1996), that civil courts not interpret
canon law.
188. See Sirico, supra note 136, at 358.
189. This feature could be ameliorated by making operation of the rule prospective,
but this is probably not an area where a prospective-only rule would be desirable. The
important transactions often happened decades ago, and so courts could still be applying
the "old rule," whatever that was, to cases 50 or even 100 years from now.
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How far are these various possibilities realized in judicial decisions?

Few courts have adopted a stringent secular documents test, 190 and the
Supreme Court certainly has not required one. When it decided
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, the Supreme Court remanded to the state courts a
pending Maryland case in which two local churches had separated from
the Church of God.' 9 ' On remand, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that it had properly applied a neutral principles approach. 192 After examining state statutes governing the holding of church property,
the terms of the instruments deeding the property to the local churches,
and provisions of the constitution of the general church and of the local
church charters, the state court concluded that the majorities within the
local churches could withdraw from the general church and retain their
properties. 193 The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, a decision on the
merits, in Maryland and VirginiaEldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg,Inc.19 4 Its per curiam opinion said that "the Maryland
court's resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious doctrine."'195 Whatever may be the limits of inquiry, courts are not precluded
from examining church constitutions and bylaws. The Court went further, in a sense, in Jones v. Wolf'196 On the issue of identifying the "true
congregation" within the local church, the Court indicated that Georgia
might have a presumption of majority rule, but that a court was requiredto
look in the corporate charter or constitution of the general church to see
97
if that presumption should give way.'
Occasionally, courts have indicated that passages should not be considered because they are parts of essentially religious documents. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said in 1985, "[t] he ...reliance
on selected passages from the Book of Order was misplaced in that the
court ignored the overall intent of that book as a means of overseeing the
spiritualdevelopment of member churches." 198 However the court's language is interpreted, its argument fails. The court might have believed
that what was mainly a religious document was not intended to have secular legal significance. It is as if two friends exchanged promises with the
190. For one example, see Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius
v. Kelemen, 256 N.E.2d 212, 217 (Ohio 1970).
191. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
192. See Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 A.2d 162, 165 (Md. 1969).
193. See id. at 166-70.
194. 896 U.S. 867 (1970).
195. Id. at 868.
196. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
197. But see Ellman, supra note 163, at 1399, for a different interpretation.
198. Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317, 1325 (Pa. 1985). A somewhat
similar position is taken about canon law in Perciaccante, supra note 187, at 191 n.104,
208-09 (discussing disputes that reach beyond the bounds of religious communities).
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clear understanding that they would not be enforceable at law. Although
churches might want provisions to be nonenforceable, most church constitutions and similar legal standards are designed to have relevance for
disputes civil courts must resolve. Even if many internal church standards
serve partly to carry forward religious and spiritual understandings, some
are also meant for civil enforcement. A second reading of the opinion is
that the religious significance of the entire document renders interpretation of apparendy secular passages impossible. Again, one can imagine
that ordinary sounding terms would take on special significance in a doctrinal setting, but ordinary provisions about control of property should
not be so understood. The third understanding of what the Pennsylvania
court said is that judges should simply not be interpreting documents the
main significance of which is religious. But this position makes little
sense when particular passages bear on a civil dispute and do not themselves require an inappropriate form of interpretation. Most courts, sensibly, have not construed neutral principles to restrict the kinds of documents that can be examined. Courts should be able to look at any
documents, so long as they can interpret crucial passages in the appropriate way.
2. The Nature of the Inquiry - Deciding what documents may be examined is simpler than determining how they may be examined, and
what else may be considered. Language in express trusts and in other
documents with secular importance may be examined for its ordinary
(nonreligious) implications, but may courts go beyond this? To understand the possibilities, it helps to distinguish doctrines, practices, and
church government. Doctrines include, for example, the belief in the
Trinity, the significance of communion, and the authority of the Bible.
In contrast, practices include such matters as an all-male priesthood (or a
priesthood open to women), worship on Sunday (or Saturday), and use
of wine for communion. Government, in turn, concerns the procedures
and structures of authority, including, crucially, relations between a denomination's general church and its locals. As I have suggested, practices
and government nearly always bear some relation to doctrine, and one
court has remarked, "it is difficult if not impossible to disassociate doctrine from government or determine where the one ends and the other
begins." 19 9 The results of cases vary as much as they do partly because
200
opinions reflect confusion over what should be taken into account,
and whether it matters that a doctrine, practice, or institution of government is undisputed.
199. Fairmount Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Holston of the Presbyterian
Church of the United States, 531 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting
Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. North Red Bank Cumberland Presbyterian Church,
430 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. C. App. 1968)).
200. It is always difficult, however, to tell whether judicial opinions that evidence
confusion reflect actual confusion or a desire to obscure troubling points.
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Courts typically go beyond express documentary language at least as
far as considering undisputed matters of church government; they will
look at the basic authority regional and national bodies have over local
churches. 2 0 ' No court takes into account disputed matters of doctrine,
since Supreme Court cases definitely establish the unconstitutionality of
doing so. Some courts talk as if even undisputed matters of doctrine are
beyond their inquiry,20 2 and it is indeed doubtful that civil courts should
try to draw any conclusions about relations of property from the basic
religious doctrines of a group. But then, what of disputed matters of governance? Given the connections of doctrine to governance, a court employing neutral principles should try to avoid disputed questions of governance that cannot be resolved by examining documents with secular
import. Some courts, however, have seemed willing to resolve disputed
questions of governance as an aid to interpreting othenvise vague
203
language.
In a case involving the power of the Diocese of a Bulgarian Orthodox
Church over a local congregation, an Illinois appellate court suggested
that "the court should weigh the conflicting testimony regarding the alleged oral subordination agreement between the local church and regional diocese and any evidence of prior construction or interpretation
given by St. Sophia [the local church] to provisions regarding control in
its organizational documents." 20 4 Accounts of oral agreements and prior
interpretations may be colored by the witnesses' understandings of doctrines and religious practices. Use of these sources seems appropriate
only upon two conditions. A court should screen out whatever matters
would be beyond consideration if it were considering written documents,
and, contrary to what the Illinois court intimates, it should not try to resolve serious factual disputes about agreements and interpretations that

201. See, e.g., Templo Ebenezer v. Evangelical Assemblies, 752 S.W.2d 197, 198-99
(Tex. App. 1988).
202. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983)
(dismissing case alleging church officials failed to follow accepted "ecclesiastical due
process" on the grounds that the claim involved "inherently religious issues," without
suggesting that these issues are actually in dispute in any way).
203. Although not applying it in the case, the court discusses what it calls a "living
relationship" test in Southern Ohio State Executive Offices of Church of God v. Fairborn
Church of God, 573 N.E.2d 172, 182-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). "The living relationship test
looks beyond the ordinary indicia of property ownership expressed in deeds, articles of
incorporation, and like documents, and examines the rituals and practices of the churches
in dispute to determine the governmental relationship or polity prevailing." Id. at 182-83.
This would include factors such as whether the "defendant attended church conventions,
acted as a delegate, had expenses paid, etc." Kendysh v. Holy Spirit Byelorussian
Autocephalic Orthodox Church, 683 F. Supp. 1501, 1510 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing United
Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, 34 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Mich. 1948)),
aff'd, 850 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988).
204. Aglikin v. Kovacheff, 516 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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have not been reduced to writing. 20 5 These two conditions were met in a
recent New Jersey case in which the court gave some weight to audio taped assurances a Methodist Bishop gave about the continuing con20 6
trol of local church trustees over property.
Some practices appear substantially more straightforward than doctrines, but in few cases after Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church have courts relied on practices (as distinct from governance) to
help settle disputes about control of property. Nevertheless, there are
some difficult questions about how traditional practices should bear on
the interpretation of express trusts and on the authority of congregations.
Specifically, should there be at least some basic practices that a religious
body must maintain if it is to continue to hold property given when those
practices were in effect?
Shifts to mixed seating from the traditional separate seating of men
and women in Orthodox Jewish synagogues raise the relevance of an undisputed prior practice that is altered. In two cases that preceded Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, synagogues held their
property with the understanding that use was limited to OrthodoxJewish
services. A majority of each congregation voted to allow men and women
to sit together. The Michigan Supreme Court sustained the argument by
a minority faction that this violated traditional practices. 20 7 The
Louisiana Supreme Court, on the other hand, decided that Orthodox
principles did not bar mixed seating, even though both the charter and
donation inter vivos in that case had specified Orthodox services as con208
ducted in Poland.
A more recent version of the problem did not involve control of
property, but one can easily imagine an otherwise similar scenario that
would. An Orthodox congregation merged with two already merged congregations; the new congregation affiliated in 1960 with the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America.2 0 9 From 1960 to 1983,
women had limited participation in services, but, in 1983, a majority
voted to grant them full participation. The congregation subsequently
amended its bylaws so that members had to commit themselves to equality of women in religious services. 210 In response, some members sued to
205. See Hinkle Creek Friends Church v. Western Yearly Meeting of Friends Church,
469 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). In that case, the court gave some weight to expert
testimony about the hierarchical structure of the Society of Friends and the authority at
each meeting level, but it did not say how it would have regarded reliance on such
testimony if there had been serious disagreement about degrees of authority.
206. See Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African
Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 84-85 (3d Cir. 1996).
207. See Davis v. Scher, 97 N.W.2d 137 (Mich. 1959).
208. See Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515 (La. 1961).
209. See Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem, 491 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985).
210. See id. at 960.
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void this membership requirement.2 11 According to the trial court, a
New York Presbyterian Church case indicated "that if the original
precepts of a church were known, uncontested and unambiguous, then
those precepts could form the basis of doctrinal trust to which claimants
to that church's property must be faithful."2 1 2 The trial judge concluded
that an earlier court-ordered stipulation evidenced that people "devoted
to Orthodox tenets" and opposed to mixed seating could continue to be
members; the new bylaws interfered with their rights and were therefore
invalid.2 13 The Appellate Division reversed, on the ground that "membership requirements are strictly an ecclesiastical matter and decisions of
2 14
the church or synagogue are binding on the courts."
Since religious practices often evolve with religious doctrines, in general courts are no more warranted in awarding property because one
group has been more faithful than another to traditional practices, than
in relying on faithfulness to traditional doctrines. Does this principle
leave any room for an express trust that is conditioned on traditional
practices of a religion, but does not make reference to any specific practice, such as separate seating? Ira Mark Ellman remarks about property
claims after a congregation has voted to have mixed seating:
What the courts needed to decide in the synagogue cases was
not the essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the essence of the grantor's intent. The
courts ought to have determined whether the language.of the
trust instrument by which the grantor conditioned his gift
should have been construed,
under normal rules of interpreta21 5
tion, to bar mixed seating.
What Ellman suggests does not directly involve judges determining
whether a departure from a prior practice is significant. But how is a
court to make ajudgment about "the essence of the grantor's intent," if
he or she donated the property well before a sweeping change in conceptions of roles of men and women? How can a judge decide the importance of separate seating and limited participation of women in services,
without being affected by how most OrthodoxJews now regard these matters, and, indeed, how the judge himself or herself regards them?2 1 6 Be211. See id.
212. Id. at 961 (citing First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United
Presbyterian Church in the United States, 464 N.E.2d 454, 462 (N.Y. 1984)).
213. Id.
214. Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem, 513 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. 1987) (appeal
dismissed on grounds that order appealed from does not finally determine the action
within the meaning of the Constitution). For the resolution of a later stage of this case, see
Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B'nai Jacob, 664 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1997).
215. Ellman, supra note 163, at 1416. Compare Ogilvie, supra note 19, at 380
(considering Basis of Union of United Church of Canada).
216. Matters are simpler when virtually no time has elapsed between an original
understanding and a shift in seating arrangements. In Fisher v. Congregation B'nal
Yitzhok, 110 A.2d 881, 882-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955); a rabbi had agreed to sing the chants
at High Holiday services for $1200. He had been assured that traditional Orthodox
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yond opinions on those specific practices will lie deeper assumptions
about appropriate changes within religions. The prior practice is clear
enough, but whether that is crucial for present use of property can hardly
be disentangled from what the crucial ingredients of Orthodox Judaism
are in modem times. Unless the grantor's wishes expressly cover separate
seating, a judgment about that will almost inevitably be colored by an
evaluation of the significance of a particular shift and the acceptability of
change more generally.
Courts should not assume that a grantor intended continuation2 1of7
any specific practices, unless the grant explicitly covers those practices,
or the new practices, according to an overwhelmingly dominant public
understanding, make the group a different kind of religious body. What
I have in mind by this latter condition are such instances as a majority of
an Orthodox Jewish congregation accepting Christianity or Islam, and
adopting the practices of that religion.2 1 8 In that event, a court could
reject the congregation's claim that it continued to be Orthodox Jewish.
The possible relevance of an individual's beliefs and practices became an issue in an interesting case that did not involve control of religious property. In that case, a woman attempted to disinter her father's
body from an Orthodox Jewish cemetery so that he might be reburied
with her mother. The cemetery association refused her request on the
ground that, "under Orthodox Jewish law, disinterments are permitted
only under very limited circumstances."2 19 Orthodox and Reform rabbis
who testified disagreed "over how to apply Jewish law to determine the
decedent's religious beliefs, [his] desires regarding burial, and whether
disinterment would be permitted."2 20 Since the father had expressed no
wishes regarding burial, the trial court tried to determine his religious
beliefs and thereby his wishes about burial. Based primarily on his keeping a kosher home, the court determined that he was an Orthodox Jew,
principles, including separate seating, would be observed. On the eve of moving to a new
synagogue, the congregation voted to have mixed seating. The rabbi felt he could not
attend; unable to find alternative work at the same fee, he sued in contract for the
difference. Though nothing relevant appeared in the written contract, the court held in
his favor on the basis that a custom or usage may be considered part of the contract. Since
the court needed only to decide what was a reasonable understanding between a cantor
and a congregation at a particular point in time, it could appropriately conclude that if
many Orthodox rabbis will not sing at mixed services, and the rabbi has been assured that
seating would not b- mixed, then the congregation has broken the contract.
217. If the grantor has explicitly conditioned a trust on separate seating, one could
still argue that this no longer has the significance it had at that time. In order to protect
express conditions, .uch arguments should rarely succeed.
218. I see this as an exception for truly extreme cases. I have not tried to work out the
exact dimensions of the exception, and I do not mean to assert that it should never cover
shifts within a major religious tradition. Probably a grant conditional on preserving
traditions of the Society of Friends could be forfeited if a Quaker meeting joined the
Roman Catholic Church.
219. Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Colo. App. 1991).
220. Id.
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although he worked on the Sabbath, dined at non-kosher restaurants,
and went to synagogue only on high holidays. The court concluded that
he would not wish to be disinterred, and that the disinterment would also
be a desecration of hallowed ground, with a negative impact on the cemetery.2 21 The court of appeals reversed because the trial court had "impermissibly based its determination that... [the] father was an Orthodox
Jew" and would oppose disinterment "on conflicting theological conclusions of various religious scholars."22 2 This resolution of conflicting theo223
logical principles was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
Does it follow that courts should never rely on individuals' religious
beliefs and practices to determine their likely wishes? The Colorado
court does not say what its disposition would have been had it been undisputed not only that Orthodox Jews generally wish not to be disinterred,
but also that the father was an Orthodox Jew. Should a court use someone's undoubted religious beliefs and practices to conclude that he
would not wish to be disinterred? It might be argued that a court should
not make such determinations, because reliance on religious beliefs is
inappropriate in principle, or because in a country where many individuals do not subscribe to standard doctrines and practices of their religions,
one could not confidently infer a conviction about the practice of disinterment from other beliefs and practices.2 24 However, if a court were
unable to draw from religious beliefs and practices in this way, it would be
denying itself the most relevant evidence of what someone would have
wanted. Probably the best understanding of the case is that the trial
court's determination is unacceptable, precisely because it resolves matters on which religious experts disagree, not because it pays any attention
at all to whether the father was an OrthodoxJew, and whether Orthodox
Jews would wish to be disinterred.
We should not move too quickly from the right resolution for a case
of this sort to treatment of trusts that concern the property of entire congregations. In the hypothetical disinterment case in which a person's
religious adherence and the practices of that religion are undisputed, the
general practices would reasonably be used as a basis to infer what the
individual would have wanted. In the trust case, practices have shifted
from the time the trust was granted up to the present. Unless continuation of a specific practice has been made a condition of a trust, courts
have little basis from which to infer how the grantor would have regarded
a change embraced by his co-religionists as social attitudes have changed.
This section may be summarized as follows. If courts adhere to neutral principles, they determine issues of church governance mainly by attending to the ordinary secular implications of documents, like church
221. See id.
222. Id. at 1009.
223. See id.
224. The latter view was taken by a number of students in a Church-State seminar I
taught in the fall of 1996.
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constitutions, intended to have civil law effect. They may use undisputed
principles of governance to interpret the significance of documents.
They should not rely upon a prior practice (such as segregated seating)
to assert that the conditions of a trust have not been kept, unless the
grantor has insisted upon that particular practice. When a practice is an
undisputed aspect of a religion, however, a court may infer an individual's attitude toward the practice from his or her involvement in the religion. It is worth noting that since some of the issues in this section (for
example, the treatment of express trusts) are not clearly resolved by principles of deference under the polity approach, certain conclusions
reached here should be followed by courts committed to that approach,
as well as by courts using neutral principles.
E.

Wat Showing Is Needed To Establish Possessoy Rights?

Courts have differed significantly over what a general church must
do to establish that property possessed formally by the local membership
is held on its behalf. The crucial questions are how express the trust for a
general church must be, and what burden of proof it must meet. The
dissent in Jones v. Wolfreads as if the majority requires an express understanding for a trust about religious property. Actually, neither the majority opinion itself nor any other Supreme Court decisions are so limiting,
but some courts have made it virtually impossible for general churches to
have trusts declared in their favor unless they establish the requisites of
an express trust. 225 According to standard trust law, implied trusts may
be either "resulting" or "constructive." Resulting trusts arise in limited
circumstances when the settler did not intend the titleholder to take an
entire interest in the property; constructive trusts are imposed as an exercise of equity jurisdiction to remedy unjust enrichment. 226 Ordinary
church property disputes do not comfortably fit either of these models,
and some courts applying neutral principles have been hesitant to discern an implied trust for the general church.2 27 Others have found a
controlling interest for a general church even when the circumstances
are not within the ordinary law of implied trust.2 28 Given the unique
historical legal background of many of the crucial transactions about
church propety, courts should be willing to expand on ordinary trust
225. See, e.g., Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, 551 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981). One commentator proposes that even express language in constitutions and
bylaws of the general church should be insufficient to create a trust in the face of silence by
the local church; she further proposes that such provisions should be enforceable only
when they are "the product of an open negotiation process between two parties of equal
bargaining power." Gerstenblith, supra note 171, at 571.
226. See Gerstenblith, supra note 171, 554-56.
227. See, e.g., Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
228. See Kendiysh v. Holy Spirit Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, 683 F.
Supp. 1501, 1510-12, (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988).
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law, 229 finding implied trusts in some conditions that do not meet the
usual requisites of resulting and constructive trusts.
The second and related issue is the weight of the showing or burden
that a general church must carry. Gerstenblith has written, "[i] n order to
impose a trust on the disputed property, [some] courts require a high
standard of intent and, therefore, generally conclude that the indication
of a trust is insufficient." 230 Other courts do not seem to require the
23 1
general church to carry a much greater burden than the local church.
In light of the complex history of state requirements for the holding of
church property and shifting legal doctrines about relations between general and local churches, the latter approach is preferable.
F. Episcopalianand PresbyterianCases
Because courts apply neutral principles in various ways, cases whose
facts are similar end up being decided differently. The complexities of
interpretation and the uneven pattern of results are illustrated clearly by
some recent cases that involve the Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches.
Cases involving both groups reveal that some judges are very hesitant to
conclude that the national church holds a trust when property is formally
in the name of the local church. Other cases are more "liberal" about
drawing conclusions favorable to the general church based on church
constitutions, bylaws, and the history of relations between national and
local. The cases thus illustrate the following central point: Knowing that
a court will use a neutral principles approach alone may not provide competing claimants with much of a guide as to how a case will be decided.
One state judge, after surveying relevant cases, has commented,
"[a]pparently, the Supreme Court's optimistic conclusions concerning
neutral principles have been misplaced. What has emerged is a welter of
contradictory and confusing case law largely devoid of certainty, consis232
tency, or sustained analysis."

229. Even if a general church fails in its effort to have a court declare that property is
held on its behalf, it may nonetheless succeed indirectly if a court determines that the
general church makes a final determination about who constitutes the local church. A
restrictive attitude toward implied trusts would not necessarily preclude a decision that
membership is within the domain of the general church.
230. Gerstenblith, supra note 171, at 544. If the documents to be interpreted were
adopted after the relevant law was adequately clear, the denomination usually has a greater
ability to draft and insist on language. One might conclude "that the burden of clarifying
ambiguous provisions regarding property should fall primarily on the denomination."
Bennett, supra note 150, at 184.
231. See, e.g., Bishop and Diocese v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 99 (Colo. 1986).
232. John Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the Church, 9
St. Thomas L. Rev. 319, 353 (1997); see also Venable, supra note 158, at 745 ("It has been
suggested that the concept of neutral principles is too manipulable to be used with any
consistency when resolving church property disputes ..
").
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1. Episcopalian Cases - In Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker,233 a
California court was very stingy about finding a trust for the national
Episcopal Church. The court considered whether four Los Angeles
churches that had seceded from national and regional affiliation lost title
to property held in their names. Relying on an earlier California case,
23 4
the court rejected a deference approach in favor of neutral principles.
It also rejected doctrines of implied trust as inapplicable: These doctrines either required an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine, or
they concerned a kind of diversion from basic charitable purposes that
was not involved. 23 5 According to the court, the crucial inquiry was
whether an express trust had been created: "Simply put, the issue [is] ...
whether the local churches expressly hold their property in trust for
members of the Diocese and PECUSA [Protestant Episcopal Church in
the United States of America] ."236 The court looked to "four general sets
of facts: (1) the deeds to the property, (2) the articles of incorporation of
the local church, (3) the constitution, canons, and rules of the general
church, and (4) relevant state statutes, if any, governing possession and
disposition of such property."23 7 Applying these standards, the court concluded that a trust for the general church had been created only in one
instance. 238 In all four instances, the property was held in the name of
the local church. California statutes were silent on this subject until 1939,
when a law authorized incorporation of a subordinate body of a national
body, with a provision for disposition of assets if the charter was surrendered. Until 1958, the constitution, canons and rules of the general
church did not mention any express trust; in 1958, Canon 10.06 made
property distributable to the Diocese when a parish dissolved. Holy
Apostles Church was incorporated in 1963 as a subordinate body of the
general church and diocese, and it was arguable that its articles of incorporation incorporated Canon 10.06. As to its property, an express trust
for the general church existed. In contrast, the other churches had been
incorporated before 1958, so they did not implicitly accept the principles
adopted by Canon 10.06.239 These other three parishes had agreed upon

admission to the general church that they would forever be bound by the
authority of the bishop and the general church and would accede to their
constitution, camons, doctrine and worship. The court, however, called
these "nothing more than expressions of present intention," as with the
233. 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1981).
234. See id. at 549.
235. See id. at 549-52.
236. Id. at 55:3.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 555-56.
239. Two of these three churches were incorporated before the 1939 statute; the third
was incorporated in 1944, but the articles did not declare that it was being incorporated as
a subordinate bodv of a national church. See id. at 555.
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marriage vow, not precluding "a change in heart."240 The court concluded that no express trust was impressed on the three churches.
A dissenting judge took a different view. Based on evidence about
the relationship of the parishes to the diocese and general church, he
said:
[t] heir relationship literally oozes the clear intention and ambition of each of the four parishes to severally achieve acceptance
as a parish within the embrace of PECUSA with full knowledge
that such acceptance meant the subordination of each to the
Constitution and Canons of PECUSA and the transfer of the
property of each to the Diocese of
Los Angeles upon dissolution
241
or other means of disaffiliation.
The right approach, in his view, was that "which comes closest to recognizing those factors which define the nature of the relationship of the
parties and therefore are best calculated to indicate what was contem242
plated by them in arriving at and agreeing upon that relationship."
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied neutral principles much like
the California court. Noting that property had been acquired exclusively
by efforts of the local congregation, the court found insufficient basis to
create an express trust.243 It relied in part on commentary to the

annotated constitution of the general church that indicated that an apparently relevant restriction in the canons is of "moral value only." 244
245
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Bishop and Diocese v. Mote,
took a neutral principles approach that was much less restrictive in what
it allowed courts to infer from relevant documents. Faced with a dispute
between a majority of the local church that wished to withdraw from the
general church and a minority loyal to that church, it gave weight to the
ways in which the local parish had acceded in governance to the diocese
and general church, and, in particular, to precise provisions in the general church canons that gave forms of control over local church
property.24 6 Indicating that a "truly neutral analysis" should begin with-

out "any presumption,"2 47 it said that "the intent to create a trust can be
inferred from the nature of property transactions, the circumstances surrounding the holding of and transfer of property, the particular docu240. Id. at 554. The court's analogy is itself disconcerting. Legal permission of
divorce should be viewed as allowing people to withdraw from promises, not as an
indication that marriage vows are merely "statements of present intention." "It is my
present intention-I don't promise" is language better suited to parents planning to take
children to the movies on the weekend.
241. Id. at 557.
242. Id.
243. See Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Ky. 1988).
244. Id. at 586.
245. 716 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1986).
246. See id. at 105-07.
247. Id. at 99.
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ments or language employed, and the conduct of the parties." 248 No particular language was required to create what could amount to "an express
trust created by implication in fact."249 A court need not shy away from
"documents, or provisions in documents, that intertwine religious concepts with matters otherwise relevant to the issue of who controls the
property."250 , Treating the provision in the local church's corporate bylaws that accepted the constitution and canons of the general church as
much more significant than the Barker majority did, the court said that
various canons that specify forms of control over local property by the
general church "demonstrate the irrevocable nature of the dedication of
property by the local church corporation for the purpose of advancing
the work of PECUSA."2 51 These were sufficient to establish that a trust
2 52
had been imposed for use of the general church.
2. Presbyterian Cases. - An examination of cases involving
Presbyterian churches reveals a similar variation of approaches among
courts applying neutral principles. The highest courts in New York and
Pennsylvania decided cases in favor of local Presbyterian churches. In
1984, the New York Court of Appeals held that a local church that had
voted 334 to 4 to depart from the United Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America could retain its property.253 In a somewhat puz-

zling passage, the court said it was improper to rely on provisions of the
Book of Order, even ones that mention control of property, because they
are located outside the property section of the Book of Order.
They deal with church government and relate only indirectly to
the control of property. They set forth the mechanism of
church government in the event of a church dispute and any
inquiry into their meaning by a court is constitutionally foreclosed because it would require the court to choose between the
insurgent25 Session and the commission or "replacement
session." 4
248. Id. at 100.
249. Id. at 10' n.14; see id. at 100-01.
250. Id. at 101.
251. Id. at 107.
252. See also Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(indicating that the general church would win under either the deference or neutral
principles approach); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 417 A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1980)
(similar); see generally Ross, supra note 169, 305-16 (arguing that a neutral principle
approach is constitutionally preferable to the polity approach but needs to be more
uniform in application); Robert J. Bohner, Jr., Note, Religious Property Disputes and
Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow Application of the Neutral Principles
Approach, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 949, 981 (1990) (arguing that a narrow neutral principles
approach "properly places intrisically religious evidence . . . outside the purview of the
court's inquiry").
253. See First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in
the United States, 464 N.E.2d 454, 463 (N.Y. 1984).
254. Id. at 462.
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Apparently, a court was not to rely on provisions about church government, even if they were clear, because doing so would mean taking sides
between disputing factions, and even provisions specifically dealing in
part with property were not to be considered if the provisions dealt
mainly with church government. This is an extremely restrictive and indefensible view of permissible inquiries under neutral principles. Courts
should be able to rely on provisions that deal clearly with legal relations
over property in whatever context they may be found..
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upholding the
claim of a local church said that the trial judge's "reliance on selected
passages from the Book of Order was misplaced in that the court ignored
the overall intent of that book as a means of overseeing the spiritualdevelopment of member churches. '2 55 Further, the passages "are far from
constituting the clear unequivocal evidence necessary to support a conclusion that a trust existed."2 56
The Virginia Supreme Court, without rendering a final decision
about who should win a conflict between a local church and the Norfolk
Presbytery, elaborated a principle of decision favorable to local
churches.2 57 It said that the Presbytery had the burden of proving that
trustees of the local church "have violated either the express language of
'2 58
the deeds or a contractual obligation to the general church.
On the other hand, ten years after Barker, the California
Episcopalian case, a branch of California's intermediate appellate court
took a more generous approach to finding a trust in resolving a conflict
between a local majority disaffected with the national church and a minority loyal to it.25 9 The court said that the Presbytery had acquired the
initial properties for the local church and had worked with the church
for 80 years.2 60 The Book of Order of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America provides that property is held in trust for it, and
the local church's articles of incorporation expressed adherence to the
255. Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317,
1325 (Pa. 1985) (emphasis in original) (commented upon in Neil W. Head, Case Note,
Neutral Principles Approach in Interchurch Property Disputes-Presbyteiyof Beaver-Butler of
the United Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 59 Temp.
L.Q. 789 (1986)); see also Presbytery of Elijah Paris Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465 (Mo.
1984); Foss v. Dykstra, 319 N.W.2d 499 (S.D. 1982) (both adopting neutral principles
approach).
256. Presbytery of Beaver-Butler,489 A.2d at 1325.
257. See Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 201 S.E.2d 752 (Va. 1974).
258. Id. at 758; see also Trinity Presbyterian Church of Montgomery v. Tankersley,
374 So. 2d 861, 867 (Ala. 1979) (holding that a minority faction faithful to the national
church was estopped because the Presbytery had afforded local churches permission to
withdraw and the national church had waited nearly three years before declaring that the
action of the Presbytery was unconstitutional).
259. See Korean United Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles v. Presbytery of the Pac.,
281 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. App. 2d 1991).
260. See id. at 398.
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doctrines and discipline of the general church. 261 The court concluded
that property was held in express trust for the national church, relying in
part on a post-Barker statute that provides that a trust is presumed in religious assets "to, the extent that, the articles or bylaws of the corporation,
or the governing instruments of a superior religious body or general
church of which the corporation is a member, so expressly provide. 26 2
The court was untroubled by the idea that a statute enacted after Barker
might alter the approach of Barkerfor transactions that took place prior
to the statute. 'Either the court viewed Barkeras too restrictive (and therefore wrongly decided) or assumed that refusal to defer to provisions in
general church law was not required constitutionally, and that the rule of
the case could be altered by the statute, even for events preceding its
passage. The court placed substantial emphasis on a provision in the
Book of Order, adopted in 1981, that provided an express trust in
2 63
property for the national church.
The court further said that the identity of the "true" local church was
an ecclesiastical matter, to be judged by superior tribunals for a hierarchical church. 264 On this basis, the court concluded that the judgment of
the Presbytery decided that question, in accord with the Book of
Order. 265 The court indicated that it would have reached a similar result

on that issue by a proper application of neutral principles, given the local
church's incorporation of adherence to the governance of the general
2 66
church.
Commencing with a deference approach but concluding that it
would reach the same result under neutral principles, the Supreme Court
of Iowa upheld a claim by the United Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America that property of a local church that had disaffiliated by
a vote of 192 to 96 was held in trust for it.2 67 Rejecting the claim that the
local church had "actually functioned as an ecumenical church" despite
its being formally a local Presbyterian church, the court said that it would
require "an impermissible inquiry into doctrine for us to determine
268
whether this function was consistent with Presbyterian teachings."
Since the local church was a subordinate part of a hierarchical church,
the presbytery's decision regarding the property dispute was conclusive
under the compulsory deference approach; 269 neutral principles would
yield the same outcome because the local church had agreed to follow
261. See id. at 400-01.
262. Id. at 412 (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted).
263. See id. at 414.
264. See id. at 408.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 408-11.
267. See Fonken v. Community Church of Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 816-19 (Iowa
1983). The local church affiliated itself in 1964 with the United Presbyterian Church in
the United States.
268. Id. at 816.
269. See id. at 816-17.
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the decisions and procedures of the general church tribunals. 270 The
change in the 1981 constitution of the general church did not show that a
different principle prevailed before that time; the addition was meant to
27 1
clarify uncertainty created by Jones v. Wolf.
Three dissenting judges applying neutral principles would have decided for the local church, since no language created an express trust
and the conditions for implied trusts were not met. 272 As to which local
faction controlled, the dissenters adopted a presumption of majority rule,
which they did not find overcome by relevant provisions of the general
2 73
church constitution or local church charter.
VI. POLyrY v. NEUTRAL PRiNciPLEs: PREFERABLE APPROACHES AND
CONSTrrUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Our examination has shown three serious defects in the standard
polity approach. First, the extreme deference to the highest adjudicatories in all hierarchical churches is out of line with treatment of nonreligious associations and fails to reflect the expectations of many church
members. Second, the stark variation in treatment of hierarchical and
congregational churches is unwarranted. Third, drawing the line between hierarchical and congregational churches can sometimes be
troublesome. To some extent, these problems can be met by regarding
church organizations as hierarchical in some respects though congregational in others, but that approach introduces other difficulties that I
have addressed. 2 74 In any event, if the courts begin to engage in more
subtle differentiations of this sort, it is hard to see how they will make
those determinations without employing a version of neutral principles.
In sum, the polity approach in its pure form is seriously flawed, despite its
2 75
endorsement by the Supreme Court in SerbianEastern Orthodox Diocese.
The flaws of the polity approach are great enough to make some
type of neutral principles approach preferable. Of course, one possible
result of neutral principles analysis is that a church is organized to give
absolute authority to its highest bodies. And, for issues that are so inextricably religious that secular neutral principles cannot help in resolving
them, a court may reasonably adopt a deference approach for hierarchi270. See id. at 817-18.
271. 443 U.S. 595 (1979); see also Adickes v. Adkins, 215 S.E.2d 442, 444-45 (S.C.
1975) (apparently applying a deference approach to decide who is the controlling local
faction); Fairmount Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Holston, 531 S.W.2d 301,
305-06 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (deciding that an implied trust existed in favor of general
church; saying that result conformed with neutral principles, but not identifying a
difference between that approach and deference); Schismatic and Purported Casa Linda
Presbyterian Church v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 700, 705-07 (Tex. App.

1986) (applying deference approach).
272.
273.
274.
275.

See Fonken, 339 N.W.2d at 819-26 (Schultz, J., dissenting).
See id. at 827.
See text accompanying notes 167-171.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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cal churches. 276 The difficult question is how neutral principles should
be applied. In addressing this question, appellate courts face a general
jurisprudential problem that bears on the best resolution of the concrete
alternatives. Perhaps what would be the best standard for sensitive, fairminded, able, intelligent judges will not be the best standard for most
actual judges. (The same observation applies to juror standards, insofar
as relevant issues may be decided by juries.) The best standard for the
best judges may permit evaluations of nuances that other judges will
make poorly or in an abusive way to favor parties that they like. If one
believes that cases involving religious organizations will often trigger unwarranted prejudices or be beyond the range ofjudicial competence, one
might favor sharper, more rigid rules than one would want for the best
judges.
A sound doctrinal standard must take the competence and prejudice
ofjudges into account, but it should not preclude judges from examining
factors that are obviously relevant to how a church is organized and to the
expectations of church members. For example, disregarding provisions
regarding property because they are in a church constitution that covers
matters of faith is quite unwarranted. Demanding explicit trust language
for transactions that occurred at a time when general churches would
expect to succeed without such language is also unwarranted. Courts
should not resolve whether altered doctrines or practices are central or
how genuine and substantial disagreements over church government and
practices should be resolved, but they should be able to interpret church
documents in a manner that does not require such judgments, and to pay
attention to clear, established practices and understandings about organizational authority.
It might be argued that giving the courts this degree of latitude will
produce uncertainty about results. But one needs to compare this worry
with the present situation, in which many courts sound more restrictive
about what they may consider. Subject to a possible qualification I shall
briefly examine, the present law is highly unpredictable for religious
groups that are neither as rigorously hierarchical as the Roman
Catholic Church, nor as straightforwardly congregational as the old
Congregationalist Churches. As a result, the law's application is highly
unpredictable for a vast range of religious organizations in the country.
The possible qualification is that looking at cases in many states does
not tell us how predictable results are in any one state. States with rather
different approaches might each have settled law within their own borders. A much more detailed, fine-grained analysis than this Article pro-

276. For a description of the development of the law of New Jersey, see generally
Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First
Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 90-94 (3rd Cir. 1996) (examining the
trend towards a neut-al principles approach in resolving intrachurch property disputes,

but emphasizing that a court might choose a deference approach depending on whether
the dispute implicates questions of religious doctrine or polity).
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vides would be needed to show widespread unpredictability. Nevertheless, in some states, notably California, we have results from appellate
courts that diverge considerably; in other states, the language of authoritative opinions is too vague or confused to provide much confidence
about what might happen. In still other states, higher courts have yet to
give authoritative guidance, so litigants must regard the patchwork of decisions outside their own states. Uncertainty about how courts will deal
with actual disputes between general and local churches exists within
277
many individual states.
The uncertainties of decision under neutral principles may make unquestioned deference to hierarchical bodies more attractive than it has
thus far been portrayed in this Article. Here is a possible defense of deference: However a higher court formulates standards under neutral principles, judges of trial courts will bend the principles to yield outcomes
that strike them as fair in the circumstances. They will, for example, be
very hesitant to take a church building away from a local membership
that overwhelmingly wants to secede from the national. Local memberships rarely decide to leave on their own; they follow ministers or priests
that have fallen out with the national. Neutral principles makes it difficult for national churches to maintain the degree of discipline called for
by their fundamental principles. Most major national churches in the
United States have well developed internaljudicial systems. Under a polity-deference approach, the highest church courts typically constitute the
highest judicatories to which the civil courts defer. In disputes between
local churches and regional or national bodies, these courts take due account of the claims of locals and can be much better trusted to deal with
competing claims fairly than can civil courts, especially since the church
courts need not wear blinders about religious understandings. 2 78 Therefore, deference is preferable to civil courts struggling with neutral
279
principles.
This argument has some force, and it shows that a defense of absolute deference need not rest on confusion or outdated conceptions of the
attitudes of typical church members. Nonetheless, I believe its most powerful aspects should be incorporated within a framework based on neutral principles. National churches should specify the range of authority
of their highest courts in documents clearly designed for recognition
277. What of the possibility that courts really rely on factors not specified in opinions,
such as the degree of unanimity of a withdrawing local church or the fairness with which
the national has dealt with the local? It is extremely unlikely that much certainty can be
derived from factors unspecified in opinions, and one could hardly recommend that basis
for predicting outcomes as a reason for supporting the present situation, unless one were
prepared to defend the legal relexace of the unspecified factors.
278. A countervailing worry may be that a national judiciary will be likely to favor the
claims of the national church over local churches, and that, for this reason, the highest
judiciaries in ecclesiastic systems may be less fair in such disputes than civil courts.
279. Something like this argument was made to me by a close friend who long served

as the chief executive of a regional church organization.
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under civil law. If that authority is inclusive, civil courts should treat disputants as having agreed to a decision by that (religious) court system.
Barring extreme delay, civil courts should await the determinations of
those religious courts and then accept their determinations, unless those
determinations are undercut by some gross failure of the religious courts
to comply with their own rules.
Instability among governing bodies is a concern that could arise even
when legal principles are relatively stable. When courts employ neutral
principles, they should seek to find an overall distribution of authority for
churches that does not itself introduce instability in church government.
As I have indicated, a conclusion that a local has absolute control over its
property, but that a national has control over the membership and governing boards of the local, is just such an unstable combination.
What I have said thus far does not settle whether or to what extent
the preferable approaches should be constitutionally required. I shall
concentrate on the Supreme Court, although state courts may well decide
that state constitutional limits reach further than what the federal
Supreme Court has said or implied about the national Constitution. The
rigid deference component of the polity approach should be declared
unconstitutional as insensitive to the diversity of American religions.
Rigid deference is constitutionally acceptable only if a denomination is
organized so that the highest church authorities are legally unconstrained; it is not acceptable for denominations that have a balance of
local and general authority, or that provide significant restrictions on the
decisions of higher authorities.
The Supreme Court should require some form of neutral principles
approach, one that allows courts to consider a broad range of documents
and also settled principles and practices of church authority that bear
clearly on matters of governance and control of property. The Supreme
Court should also make plain that when church documents intended for
civil enforcement grant wide authority to church courts to resolve disputes, civil courts applying neutral principles must give effect to the determinations of church courts that are rendered according to the authority conferred.
CONCLUSION

One might fairly regard the church property cases as a kind of constitutional backwater. They receive few, if any, pages in constitutional law
casebooks, are rarely discussed in constitutional law classes, and have received scholarly attention that is slight in comparison with that given to
standard free exercise and establishment cases. In those cases, some activity or restriction of the government is directly involved; in the church
property cases, the government's involvement is to provide a rule of law
to resolve private disputes. One might be tempted to think issues about
constitutionally permissible rules of law for the resolution of disputes
among private parties have less general interest than do more straightfor-
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ward state involvements, but the free-speech law regarding defamation
falls into this category, and it attracts very considerable attention. If our
study demonstrates nothing else, it shows that church property disputes
raise very difficult constitutional issues, and that because of various competing values, no resolution of the role of civil courts is fully satisfactory.
Perhaps the most fundamental dilemma is that courts cannot both avoid
resolving religious questions and give effect to all the expectations of
those deeply involved in religious organizations.
If one looks only to Supreme Court cases, this branch of law seems
remarkably stable, but one is reminded of the struggles beneath tranquil
surface waters. Church bodies fight for polity-deference or neutral principles, and they also fight over the precise version of either approach to
be adopted.
I have suggested that the exact approach of Watson v. Jones should be
rejected, but it has shown remarkable staying power. The polity-deference approach was put in place by the Supreme Court (as a matter of
general common law) more than a half century before any part of the
First Amendment was held applicable to the states. The Court's underlying wisdom that civil courts should not be resolving disputed issues of
religious doctrine and practice remains firmly entrenched, and it would
be carried forward even were the Supreme Court to decide that courts
must use some version of neutral principles.
Like the courts, I have treated this subject mainly on its own footing,
drawing infrequent connections to other areas of constitutional law. A
few concluding observations about how the constitutional law of church
property disputes relates to major directions in establishment and free
exercise law may be illuminating. I offer these in the spirit of seeing the
issues in all these areas more deeply and of providing some further starting points for analysis, not as a means to predict subsequent decisions.
Prediction is not promising here, both because this subject matter has
been treated so independently and because it may well be another twenty
years before the Supreme Court ventures again into this terrain.
For a substantial time, the Supreme Court employed the threefold
Lemon test as its overarching standard for establishment cases. 280 The two
relevant prongs of that standard are that the government may not have
the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and that the government
may not become excessively entangled with religion. The Supreme Court
sometimes has relied on a complementary principle that the government
may not discriminate among religions. The Lemon test, as a complete
whole, appears to have a very short shelf life.28 1 The Supreme Court has
not abandoned its major elements, though recent cases have emphasized
the acceptability of treating religious and nonreligious groups similarly.
The entanglement worry fits very well with a strong "hands-off" ap280. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
281. See Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 324-28.
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proach; courts should not become the adjudicators of religious matters.
The nonadvancement prong of Lemon and the "neutrality" approach of
allowing similar treatment may point mildly against the strong deference
for hierarchy in the polity approach. Within a religious denomination,
that approach seems to "advance" higher bodies whose behavior is challenged, and it affords those higher bodies a degree of deference that
analogous bodies in nonreligious associations would not receive. The
neutral principles approach does not match perfectly the treatment of
nonreligious associations either, because it withdraws so much from consideration, but its emphasis on formalities and on language in church
documents that is understandable by those outside the faith does not, on
its face, favor one level of church authority over another.
The dominant recent trend in free-exercise law has been to withdraw special constitutional protection for religious claimants in favor of a
view that people with religious reasons to violate laws should be treated
like all other violators unless a legislature grants them an exemption. If
one reads Employment Division v. Smith28 2 with any care, one notices that a,
or, I would say, the, major basis for the decision is that courts should not
have to assess religious understandings and the strength of religious feeling in order to decide if the religious claim is strong enough to warrant
an exemption. 2 :3 We may note that the inquiry the Court is unwilling to
make is, despite its difficulty, not nearly as difficult as the inquiry the
modern church property cases say courts cannot make. Why is the one
inquiry more difficult than the other?
In religious exemption cases, courts must figure out what an individual claimant believes and feels to see whether an exemption is warranted.
If the claim involves group behavior, the court must discern what some or
most members of a group believe and feel. A court does not have to
decide which of the competing assertions from within the group is right
or more true to a tradition. If a court is unwilling to countenance judicial
assessment when no relevant conflict exists, a fortiori it should reject assessment when conflict is present. Whatever else it may be, Smith evidences a strong attachment to the underlying premises of Watson and all
subsequent church property cases. Either polity-deference or neutral
principles avoids for the most part judicial assessment of religious matters, but the neutral principles approach fits somewhat better with the
Court's proclivities towards not having special constitutional rights for
religious claimants.
This brief look at the most directly related areas of constitutional law
hardly yields a decisive judgment about the bases upon which church
property cases should be resolved, but I believe it provides modest
support for my view that the Supreme Court should move to requiring a
282. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
283. See Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses Be Amended? (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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neutral principles approach, one that includes significant (though not
absolute) deference to what church judicial bodies have concluded and
that allows sensitive consideration of virtually all documents designed
(even partly) for civil enforcement, including whatever natural inferences
an outsider might draw without getting into debatable matters of doctrine, practice, and polity.

